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Abstract: The health landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean is changing quickly. 
The region is undergoing a demographic and epidemiological transition in which health 
problems are highly concentrated on noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). In light of this, 
the region faces two main challenges: (1) develop cost-effective policies to prevent NCD 
risk factors, and (2) increase access to quality healthcare in a scenario in which a large 
share of the labor force is employed in the informal sector. This paper describes both 
alternative interventions to expand health insurance coverage and their tradeoff with labor 
informality and moral hazard problems. The paper also focuses on obesity as a case 
example of a NCD, and emphasizes how lack of knowledge along with self-control 
problems would lead people to make suboptimal decisions related to food consumption, 
which may later manifest in obesity problems.    
Keywords: Noncommunicable diseases, obesity, health insurance. 
JEL Classification: I12, I13, I18  
.  
 
                                                          
1 Universidad de San Andrés. 
2 University of Maryland. 
3 Universidad de San Andrés. 
 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
The developing world, and in particular Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), has 
experienced both a secular decline in mortality and significant improvements in the health 
of its population over the last 200 years. As we start the 21st century, a key observation is 
that the pattern and nature of mortality and morbidity has changed over recent decades and 
continues changing today. Health systems in developing countries are facing major 
challenges mainly because of growing epidemiological diversity as a consequence of 
economic development, technological change in medicine, and population aging.  
Although LAC is not completely free of infectious diseases, is well advanced in its 
demographic and epidemiological transitions, with health problems highly concentrated on 
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). People in the region are equally likely to die 
prematurely from just one NCD than from all communicable diseases combined. Half of 
years of life lost in the region, as well as the leading causes of mortality and morbidity, are 
attributable to NCDs (Anderson et al. 2009). Furthermore, there is little doubt that the 
levels of NCDs will substantially increase in the near future. It is predicted that by 2020, 
NCDs will cause 7 of every 10 deaths in developing countries (Boutayeb 2006). Two of the 
factors believed to be central drivers of this trend are aging populations and the stark and 
simultaneous increase in rates of obesity worldwide (WHO 2013a). 
NCDs, which are characterized by shared risk factors, multi-morbidity, and 
chronicity, pose several challenges for the organization of healthcare. In order to address 
these challenges, policymakers must define a health policy frontier that identifies the 
primary interventions according to current health priorities. Taking into account where 
LAC stands in term of both its demographic and ezpidemiological transition, the health 
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policy frontier in the region must include (1) public health policies that reduce the risk 
factors that cause NCDs by promoting healthy behavior; and (2) health insurance programs 
that offer households access to quality healthcare at costs that do not impoverish them.  
Regarding the first priority of the health policy frontier, interventions that create 
conducive environments for making healthy choices available are essential to motivate 
people to adopt and sustain healthy behaviors. Although it is known that eliminating 
preventable risk factors may reduce the burden of NCDs, it is not known what the best way 
is to achieve this goal. Most public policies designed to address NCDs use a rational 
economic model of behavior that assumes people make choices that reflect their 
preferences subject to their available resources (time, information, and prices of goods and 
labor). However, the consensus on the success of traditional efforts to encourage health 
promotion is that they have been at best modestly effective (Luoto and Carman 2014).  
People could deviate from a rational model of behavior, for example, there is 
evidence that present bias (i.e., a higher discount rate between the present and the 
immediate future than between two future time periods) plays an important role in health 
behavior (Kremer and Glennerster 2012). People also face knowledge constraints – they are 
neither perfectly informed nor totally ignorant of the implications of their choices, although 
in making those choices they try to process the available knowledge rationally. For 
instance, they may choose poor diets simply because they do not know which diets are 
healthy.  
This paper explores these issues by developing a simple theoretical model of 
household decision-making to assess how lack of knowledge along with self-control issues 
affect people’s behavior related to food consumption, which later leads to weight problems 
and obesity. The focus is on obesity because it is the second-highest behavioral risk factor 
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affecting mortality (Flegal et al. 2005; Willett et al. 2005) and is now one of the major 
causes of rising healthcare costs (Finkelstein et al. 2003). In addition, there has been a 
remarkable upsurge in the number of people considered overweight or obese in all 
demographic and age groups in LAC. Compared with other regions, weight problems and 
obesity are particularly prevalent in LAC, with rates that range from 30 to 50 percent (York 
et al. 2004).   
The model presented in this paper predicts that when individuals have either self-
control problems or knowledge constraints, they make decisions that lead them to behave in 
a way that is not in their own best interest or that are unwise even according to their own 
preferences. People with self-control problems impose negative externalities on their future. 
Those within-person externalities have been called “internalities” (Whitman 2006). The 
harm resulting from an internality might be avoided in more than one way. Unfortunately, 
the private market only imperfectly provides such self-control mechanisms (Gruber 2002). 
It is very difficult to truly commit oneself to not overeat or to maintain an exercise routine, 
for example. This suggests a potential role for cost-effective policies. However, these 
policies should not prevent people from behaving in their own best interests. Ideally, these 
policies should create benefits for those who do not make reliable decisions in their best 
interest while be harmless to those that make reliable decisions.  
Robust evidence on policy interventions that address these biases among overweight 
and obese people is rather limited, and its results are mixed at best. Looking across the 
spectrum of health behaviors, it can be seen that behavioral economics offers insights that 
seem to hold promise for cost-effective public interventions. Specifically, most cost-
effective policies to combat weight problems and obesity, at least in the short and medium 
term, seem to be those that combine the provision of information with counseling and with 
5 
 
elements of behavioral economics such as incentives or commitment mechanisms. In view 
of that, identifying which interventions are the most cost-effective in achieving healthy 
behaviors in the long term is a priority of research. 
In the absence of these cost-effective interventions, policymakers must turn to 
second-best policies that could involve “sin” taxes and subsidies to discourage the 
consumption of unhealthy food. The overall empirical evidence documents that price 
manipulations have the potential to encourage healthier eating, particularly when those 
manipulations are large. Nevertheless, an important topic for future work is investigating 
how changes in prices affect health outcomes and what pricing strategies would be optimal 
for addressing excess food consumption and rising rates of obesity. 
Regarding the second priority of the health policy frontier, the provision of health 
insurance is a central element to reduce the impact of NCDs.  However, health insurance in 
LAC is mostly provided within the labor market, therefore access to healthcare services is 
restricted to workers in the formal sector, excluding those in the informal sector who 
encompass approximately 50 percent of the region’s labor force. Thus, LAC countries face 
the challenge of expanding health insurance coverage in a scenario in which a large share 
of the labor force is employed in the informal sector. There is little agreement among 
countries as to how best to achieve broader coverage. Policy interventions proposed here 
include social health insurance systems combined with publicly subsidized health insurance 
programs, as well as tax-financed systems of public health. 
A potential unintended consequence of combining social health insurance with 
publicly subsidized health insurance programs is the incentive it may create for formal 
sector workers to switch to informal employment. By doing so, workers could avoid having 
to make otherwise mandatory contributions to the social health insurance system while 
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receiving some free services under the new program. This paper presents a theoretical 
model that shows that employment-based health insurance schemes interfere with the 
functioning of the labor market. Specifically, the model predicts that improvements in the 
provision of public healthcare (e.g. public hospitals) increase the size of the informal sector 
and decrease the wages of this sector, while increasing the wages of the formal sector. 
There is scarce rigorous empirical evidence of the effect of publicly subsidized 
health insurance programs on workers’ choices of formal or informal employment in the 
region. Thus, a better understanding of the distortions generated by public health insurance 
programs and the magnitude of their effects on both health status and informality is central 
to inform policy decisions.  
Finally, the introduction of public health insurance programs may also lead to 
problems of moral hazard, which refers to the effect of insurance on the behavior of the 
insured. One of the criteria that the literature has proposed for designing public health 
insurance programs is to minimize the efficiency loss resulting from the introduction of 
such insurance (Sloan and Hsieh 2012). Policymakers have to balance moral hazard and 
risk protection in the design of public health insurance programs. 
The next section of this paper explores the evolution of LAC in term of its 
demographic and epidemiological transitions. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical 
model of health, self-control, and knowledge in the context NCDs and discusses cost-
effective interventions to address these problems. Section 4 presents the rationales for 
creating health insurance programs and describes components of their design. Section 5 
summarizes the main features of the healthcare systems in the region, and Section 6 
presents a conceptual framework that assesses the relationship between health insurance 
and the labor market. Section 7 examines alternative policies to expand health insurance 
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coverage for poor and unskilled workers in the informal sector and briefly describes the 
potential problems this might create in terms of incentivizing informality and moral hazard. 
Finally, Section 8 presents conclusions and suggests some challenges for future research.  
 
2 Health trends in Latin America and the Caribbean 
This section aims to determine the current stage of LAC’s demographic and 
epidemiological transition. The implication for policymakers is straightforward: identifying 
where the region is in terms of these transitions is critical to establish a health policy 
frontier. The section first examines the long-term trends of health worldwide and then 
develops a conceptual framework to approach the epidemiological and demographic 
transition of the region. Second, the section describes the pattern of change in mortality and 
morbidity from communicable to noncommunicable diseases in order to determine the 
priorities for health policies. 
 
2.1  Health in the long term  
Throughout the 20th century, growth in real income in developed countries was 
accompanied by a historically unprecedented reduction in mortality rates that caused life 
expectancy at birth to grow by nearly 30 years. These improvements were matched by 
similar advancements in poor and middle-income countries. In the years just after World 
War II, life expectancy gaps between rich and poor countries started to contract across the 
world. Poor and middle-income countries enjoyed rapid growth in life expectancy in the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. For example, while the increase in longevity between 1960 and 
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2005 in the United States was 7.9 years, in the same period the increase in longevity in 
China was 35.5 years (Sloan and Hsieh 2012).  
Looking at the evidence as a whole, it is possible to see the history of reduced 
mortality and increases in life expectancy as encompassing three phases (Cutler and Llera-
Muney 2006; Deaton 2005). During the first phase from the middle of the 18th century to 
the middle of the 19th century, improved nutrition and economic growth played a large role 
in health. During this phase, infectious disease mortality declined by 95 percent. Fogel 
(1994, 1997 and 2004) assigned nutritional improvements the primary role in this reduction 
in mortality. He argued that agricultural yields increased significantly during the 18th 
century, and as a result, people were better fed and thus could better resist most bacterial 
(although not viral) disease, and could recover more rapidly and more often. Neither 
personal healthcare nor public health appeared to have had much impact prior to the 1900s, 
when most of the mortality decline had already occurred in rich countries (McKeown 
1976). 
The second phase occurred in the closing decades of the 19th century and into the 
20th century. In this phase, the primary factors that contributed to the secular reduction in 
mortality were revolutionary improvements in sanitation and developments in public health 
policy (e.g. filtering and chlorinating water supplies, building sanitation systems, draining 
swamps, and pasteurizing milk). Public health did not fully come into its own until the 
acceptance of the germ theory of disease in the 1880s and 1890s, which led to a wave of 
new public health initiatives and the conveyance of safe health practices such as boiling 
bottles of milk, protecting food from insects, washing hands, and ventilating rooms, among 
others. The dramatic subsequent reduction in water- and food-borne diseases (typhoid, 
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cholera, dysentery, and nonrespiratory tuberculosis) highlighted the role of public health 
(Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Prior to the 20th century, there was little effective medical treatment for infectious 
disease. Over the course of the 20th century, the role of medical advances increased in 
importance and gave place to the third phase in mortality reduction, which dates from the 
1930s to the present. This phase has been the era of big medicine, starting with vaccinations 
and antibiotics, and moving on to the expensive and intensive personal interventions that 
characterize the medical system today. The first important medical interventions were 
vaccinations. However, quantitatively more important for mortality was the development of 
new therapeutics, such as antibiotics. By 1960, mortality from infectious diseases had 
declined to its current level. 
This “mortality revolution” spread throughout the world much more rapidly than did 
modern economic growth, leading to enormous improvements in low- and middle-income 
countries in life expectancy and mortality rates, especially among children. In these 
countries, the reduction in mortality began in the early 20th century and then accelerated 
dramatically after World War II (Lee 2003). This mainly happened because 200 years’ 
worth of progress against mortality in rich countries was rapidly brought to bear on 
mortality in poor and middle-income countries. Measures primary related to disease control 
– such as improvements in the water supply, cleansing the environment of disease vectors, 
the use of antibiotics, and widespread immunization of children – were introduced to the 
rest of the world over a relatively very short span of time (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
LAC in particular has shown a great propensity to catch up to developed countries over the 
last half century, particularly since 1970 (Jack 1999). 
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2.2  Demographic and epidemiological transitions  
The pattern and nature of mortality and morbidity has changed over the past 100 years and 
continues to change in developing countries today. This so-called epidemiological 
transition is linked with the current demographic transition, wherein population age 
structures also undergo significant changes as societies develop. 
The classic demographic transition starts with mortality reduction, followed after a 
time by reduced fertility. According to economic theories of fertility, couples wish to have 
a certain number of surviving children, rather than births per se, hence, if this assumption 
holds, once potential parents recognize an exogenous increase in child survival, fertility 
should decline. This causes population growth rates first to accelerate and then to slow 
again, moving toward low fertility, long life, and an old population.  
Although important differences remain, there has been a rapid global convergence 
in fertility and mortality among nations. The demographic transition has spread to all parts 
of the world, and is projected to be completed by 2100, when the global population will 
have risen by a factor of 10 compared with that in 1800, the length of life will have tripled 
from 27 years in 1800 to 81 at 2100, and births per woman will have dropped from six to 
two (Lee 2003).  
The epidemiological transition has paralleled the demographic transition in 
developed countries and is still under way in less-developed societies. During the 
epidemiological transition, a long-term shift occurs in mortality and disease patterns 
whereby pandemics of infection are gradually displaced by degenerative and man-made 
diseases as the main form of morbidity and primary cause of death (Omran 1971). 
With health and social conditions improving, people survive through their early 
years into middle and older ages where they face the elevated risk of dying from chronic 
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diseases. The most favorable effects on survival are concentrated among infants, children, 
and women of childbearing age (Olshansky and Ault 1986). Thus, the reduction in 
mortality that comes with the epidemiological transition widens the “demographic gap” 
between birth rates and death rates, and hence affects the demographic change by bolstering 
population growth. In a more subtle manner, the mortality transition affects demographic 
movements indirectly through its impact on fertility and the composition of the population. 
Rich countries have completed the shift from an epidemiological era characterized 
by the preponderance of communicable diseases to one characterized by noncommunicable 
diseases (Frenk et al. 1994). Developing countries have also been following this path: 
during at least the past half century, their epidemiological profile has been characterized by 
both a sharp reduction in mortality rates and a differentiation of the causes of deaths. 
Emerging NCDs have been increasing over the past two decades (Yach et al. 2004), and are 
predicted to continue to rise.  
The goal of trying to describe and disentangle the determinants of changing disease 
patterns is to elucidate some of the fundamental issues confronting policymakers. Health 
policymakers should undertake an epidemiological analysis of major diseases and health 
problems in order to define the relevant health policy frontier. This implies focusing on 
policies and targeting resources according to current health priorities without neglecting 
those health areas where intervention has been successful. 
In other words, if a country is in the early stage of the epidemiological transition 
during which major health problems are concentrated on communicable diseases, health 
policy should be centered on providing curative services – such as routine healthcare, 
vaccinations, and rehydration therapy ‒ as well as on designing programs to improve 
sanitation.  
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On the other side, if a country is in a more advanced stage of its epidemiological 
transition during which health problems are concentrated on NCDs and chronic diseases in 
adults and the elderly, the health policy frontier should be centered on preventive health 
services and health promotion. In this case, health promotion strategies should focus on 
behavioral changes related to smoking, alcohol, diet, and exercise in order to prevent deaths 
due to obesity, hypertension, atherosclerosis, and diabetes. This will require government 
interventions not only in education but also through regulation and taxation (Jamison and 
Mosley 1991; Yach et al. 2004). Policies to extend health insurance coverage are also 
essential considering that NCDs require long-term treatment.  
 
2.3  Health conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean: An overview 
In LAC the past 50 years have been positive in terms of overall levels of health, life 
expectancy, and reductions in infant mortality. Although the region is not completely free 
of infectious diseases, it is well advanced in its demographic and epidemiological 
transitions, with health problems highly concentrated on NCDs (Frenk et al. 1989).  
Since 1970, death from infections has been declining while death from NCDs has 
been increasing. There was a significant change in the causes of death over a relatively 
short period of time. This suggests that the epidemiological transition has accelerated in the 
last 40 years. At present, 14.2 percent of total deaths are due to communicable diseases, 
while NCDs and injures are responsible for 73.4 and 12.4 percent of total deaths, 
respectively. Furthermore, an increase in NCDs is expected over the coming decades in 
LAC.  
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2.3.1. Demographic transition  
LAC countries have undergone profound demographic changes that are reflected in the 
reduction in population growth (by 1.3 percent from 2005 to 2010) and in the aging of the 
population. This change results from a rapid fall in fertility, which has reached a rate of 
decline never seen before in the region (Frenk et al. 1994) – fertility fell to 2.3 children per 
women in the region according to UNDESA (2103) ‒ preceded by a sustained reduction in 
mortality (Figure 1 and Table 1). The reduction in mortality, which began toward the end of 
the first half of the 20th century, has now resulted in a life expectancy at birth of 73.4 years 
(Table 2).  
Figure 1 Crude death rate by major area 1950-2100 (deaths per 1,000 inhabitants)
 
  Source: UNDESA (2013).  
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Table 1 Levels and trends in the under-five mortality rate by region, 1950–2050 
Region 
Under-five mortality (deaths under age 5 per 1,000 live 
births) 
1950–
1955 
1970–
1975 
1990–
1995 
2005–
2010 
2045–
2050 
World  214.5 130.8 86.1 59.1 25.5 
More-developed regions 77.8 25.6 12.9 7.5 3.5 
Less-developed regions 902 247 147.5 94.9 65.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 306.7 225.8 184.9 126.2 45.8 
Africa 309.4 219.7 168.1 115.6 43.8 
   Eastern Africa 300.8 215.2 181.1 101.9 32.2 
   Southern Africa 175.6 115.3 65.9 72.8 22.6 
Asia 237.1 132 75.9 45.7 15.8 
   Eastern Asia 189.4 76.9 37.6 19.7 5.3 
   South-Central Asia 288.5 188 107.5 64.3 22.2 
Europe 94.1 29.1 15.3 8.0 3.6 
   Eastern Europe 121.7 32.3 22.9 12.1 6.3 
   Western Europe 51.8 21.3 8.0 4.5 2.0 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 187.8 113.5 49.4 27.6 8.6 
North America 36.5 21.4 10.3 7.9 3.7 
Oceania 90.7 58.7 38.2 28.1 16.6 
Source: UNICEF et al. (2012). 
Child mortality is a key indicator not only of child health and nutrition but also of 
the implementation of child survival interventions and, more broadly, of social and 
economic development. Table 1 shows that since 1970, LAC has reduced its under-5 
mortality rate by more than 70 percent and is among the developing regions with the 
greatest reduction in this indicator. This shows that the demographic transition has taken 
place rapidly. Although there is still some variation between and within countries, at the 
regional level two major changes have taken place: a reduction in demographic dependency 
(ratio of people younger than 14 or older than 65 to the working-age population) and 
population aging (ECLAC 2007). Slowly but surely, population is getting older: the 
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proportion and the absolute number of persons aged 65 and over will rise steadily in the 
coming decades (Table 3). As a result, it is projected that the number of persons aged 65 or 
over will be almost five times higher in 2050 than in 2000. 
Table 2  Life expectancy at birth by region for selected periods 
Region 
1950–
1955 
1970–
1975 
1990–
1995 
2005–
2010 
2045–
2050 
World  46.9 58.8 64.8 68.7 75.9 
More-developed regions 64.7 71.1 74.1 76.9 82.8 
Less-developed regions 41.6 55.8 62.7 67.0 74.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 36.2 44.7 48.9 52.9 67.8 
Africa 37.4 46.5 51.7 55.6 68.9 
   Eastern Africa 37.0 45.9 47.9 55.9 71.6 
   Southern Africa 44.7 53.5 62.0 51.9 68.1 
Asia 42.2 57.7 65.4 70.3 76.9 
   Eastern Asia 46.2 65.3 71.0 75.5 80.9 
   South-Central Asia 37.4 50.7 60.1 65.5 73.7 
Europe 63.6 70.6 72.6 75.3 81.3 
   Eastern Europe 60.3 69.2 68.3 69.5 74.9 
   Western Europe 67.7 71.8 76.5 80.2 85.9 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
51.4 61.0 68.9 73.4 81.8 
North America 68.6 71.4 75.8 78.4 83.7 
Oceania 60.4 66.4 72.5 76.8 81.7 
Sources: UNDESA (2013).  
Demographic aging poses significant challenges for governments. First, there is 
consensus that it is essential to increase social security coverage of the current work force 
and to expand coverage of the elderly, including the option of noncontributory or welfare 
pensions. Second, there is a need to shift the focus of care to preventive care and health 
promotion, not only in old age, but also at all other stages of the life cycle (ECLAC 2007). 
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Table 3  Indicators of population aging in Latin America, 1950–2050 
Indicator 1950 1970 1990 2000 2010 2030 2050 
Population age 65  
and above (thousands) 
5,572 11,230 20,735 28,688 38,829 81,506 136,425 
Percentage of persons  
aged 65 and above 
3.5 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.7 11.6 17.9 
Percentage of persons  
aged 75 and above 
1.0 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.6 4.5 8.2 
Median age of the  
Population 
19.9 18.6 21.8 24.3 27.4 33.9 39.6 
Ratio of older persons 
 to young personsa 
67 70.2 49.8 17.6 35 28.4 26.1 
Sources: ECLAC (2007). 
aRatio of the population aged 65 and above to the population aged under 15. 
 
2.3.2. Epidemiological transition: Communicable and noncommunicable diseases  
This subsection attempts to describe the leading causes of death from a regional perspective 
in order to characterize the epidemiological profile in LAC. 
 
2.3.2.1 Communicable diseases 
In the last three decades of the 20th century and in the early 21st century, the most 
important public health achievements in LAC have been in communicable disease control 
and basic sanitation (Echeverri et al. 2008). The displacement of communicable diseases by 
NCDs as the leading cause of death provides evidence of the region’s epidemiological 
transition (Frenk et al. 1994). 
Among communicable diseases in LAC, infectious and parasitic diseases and 
respiratory infections constitute the leading cause of death. Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, 
diarrheal diseases, and vector-borne diseases are the most prevalent. Evidence shows that 
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the region has succeeded in decreasing premature death and disability from most 
communicable, newborn, nutritional, and maternal causes.  
Rates of mortality from respiratory disease gradually decreased in all age groups 
between 1998 and 2008.1 The region has made significant progress in controlling 
tuberculosis and vector-borne diseases, but HIV/AID remains a major challenge (Table 4). 
Diarrheal disease was the number one disease burden in LAC in 1990, but dropped to the 
20th leading cause in 2010 (World Bank and Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluations 
2010).  Among the principal bacterial agents of diarrheal diseases is Vibrio cholerae 
(cholera). However, the prevalence of this disease region-wide has declined. The number of 
cholera cases reported to the World Health Organization, as well as the number of countries 
that reported cholera cases in the region, decreased in 2012 (WHO 2013b).  
Table 4  Prevalence and incidence rates of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis per 100,000 
inhabitants, by regions, 2001–2011 
Region 
HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis 
Prevalence Incidence Prevalence Incidence 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 
Africa 3,095 2,725 351 205 374 293 311 262 
The Americas 298 319 20 16 55 35 41 28 
South-East Asia 215 189 20 12 445 271 218 189 
Europe 188 263 19 20 123 56 74 42 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
76 113 11 17 245 170 118 109 
Western Pacific  40 72 7.2 7 209 138 120 92 
Source: WHO (2013a).  
 
The most sustainable investment to protect populations from cholera and other 
diarrheal diseases continues to be improvements in water supply and sanitation. The region 
                                                          
1 However, this downward trend came to a halt in 2009, probably as a result of the (H1N1) 2009 pandemic. 
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has increased coverage of safe water (access to safe water increased from 82 percent of the 
population in 1990 to 89 percent in 2002) and extended sanitation coverage, although some 
countries in LAC still have a long way to go (Fay and Morrison 2007).  
Thus, communicable diseases have become less preponderant over time and no 
longer pose the greatest current threat to public health. However, it is important to 
recognize that they still maintain a position in the epidemiological profile. 
 
2.3.1.2  Noncommunicable diseases 
According to epidemiological research, chronic NCDs are the biggest threat to the health of 
the world population. Figures for 2011 indicate that almost 36 million people died from 
NCDs around the world that year, and it is projected that by 2030 the leading causes of 
death will be ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (De Maio 2011). 
Murray and Lopez (1997) argue that the ratio of NCDs to communicable diseases is 
a crude but useful indicator of the epidemiological transition. This ratio ranges from more 
than 13 in established market economies to 0.4 in sub-Saharan Africa. According to this 
criterion, China, followed distantly by LAC and other Asia islands, are all further along the 
path of the combined demographic and epidemiological transitions, which surely will affect 
potential demand for health services in these countries. 
LAC has the third highest level of deaths due to NCDs and trails closely behind the 
group of high-income countries (Table 5).  Cardiovascular diseases and malignant 
neoplasms, followed by diabetes and chronic respiratory diseases are the leading causes of 
deaths from NCDs in LAC. 
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Table 5 Deaths by cause and regions as percentages of total deaths, 2011 
Region World 
High-
income 
countries 
Low- and middle-income countries 
East 
Asia 
and 
Pacific 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
I. Communicable, 
maternal, perinatal, 
and nutritional 
conditions 
24.4 6.6 11.0 6.2 14.2 17.3 32.4 61.9 
  A. 
Infectious and 
parasitic diseases 12.6 2.3 4.9 3.6 5.1 5.1 17.1 34.4 
  B. 
Respiratory 
infections 5.9 3.8 3.7 1.6 5.5 5.4 6.6 11.9 
  C. 
Maternal 
conditions 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.7 
  D. 
Neonatal 
conditions 4.4 0.3 1.9 1.0 2.2 5.8 7.4 9.7 
  E. 
Nutritional 
deficiencies 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.6 0.7 4.2 
II. 
Noncommunicable 
diseases 
66.4 87.4 80.7 86.2 73.5 71.8 56.1 29.1 
  A. Malignant 
neoplasm 
14.4 26.7 20.0 14.7 16.3 11.0 7.6 4.3 
  B. Other neoplasms 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 
  C. Diabetes mellitus 2.6 2.5 3.0 1.0 6.4 3.1 2.2 1.8 
  D. Endrocrine, blood, 
immune disorders 
0.9 1.1 0.5 0.4 1.3 2.4 0.6 1.6 
  E. Mental and 
behavioral 
disorders 
0.5 0.9 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 
  F. Neurological 
conditions 
2.5 7.6 1.1 0.7 2.5 1.3 1.8 1.5 
  G. Sense organ 
diseases 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  H. Cardiovascular 
diseases 
30.4 33.8 39.8 59.1 28.8 40.0 23.0 10.0 
  I. Respiratory 
diseases 
7.1 6.2 9.8 2.5 5.3 4.4 11.5 2.0 
  J. Digestive diseases 4.0 4.3 2.8 4.7 6.2 3.9 4.4 3.7 
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  K. Genitourinary 
diseases 
2.0 2.4 1.8 1.0 3.0 2.4 2.6 1.3 
  L. Skin diseases 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 
  M. Musculoskeletal 
diseases 
0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 
  N. Congenital 
anomalies 
1.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.6 1.8 
  O. Oral conditions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
III. Injuries 9.1 6.1 8.4 7.5 12.4 10.8 11.5 9.0 
    Unintentional 
injuries 
6.6 4.1 6.6 5.4 6.7 7.5 8.4 6.9 
  Intentional injuries 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 5.7 3.3 3.1 2.1 
Source: World Health Organization. Mortality estimates by cause, age and sex.  
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/en/. Accessed on 24 April 2015. 
 
From the point of view of the demographic transition, the major effect of reduced 
fertility is the resulting change in age structure, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the 
growing proportion of adults and the elderly increases the relative importance of NCDs. 
Moreover, certain NCDs are starting to attack demographics previously unaffected. For 
instance, type two diabetes, generally known as adult onset diabetes, is increasingly 
common among young populations.  
● Cardiovascular diseases 
Of total deaths caused by cardiovascular diseases in LAC, 85 percent were due to four 
causes: ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, heart failure, and hypertensive 
diseases. Among these, ischemic heart disease is the leading cause of death in the region, 
with rates markedly higher among males than females.  
The major established risk factors of cardiovascular diseases are hypertension, 
diabetes mellitus, high cholesterol, obesity, and smoking. These factors, which mainly 
depend on behavior, are highly prevalent in the region, with the most significant being 
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unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, and smoking. Behavioral risk factors are responsible 
for about 80 percent of coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular disease.  
Being overweight or obese are major risk factors for a number of chronic diseases 
apart from cardiovascular diseases, including diabetes and cancer. Worldwide obesity has 
nearly doubled since 1980. In 2008, more than 1.4 billon adults were overweight (defined 
as a body mass index, or BMI, of 25 or above). Of these, over 200 million men and women 
were obese (defined as a BMI of 30 or above).  Compared with other regions, obesity is 
highly prevalent in LAC: the rate for obesity and being overweight ranges from 30 to 50 
percent (York et al. 2004). Furthermore, a recent WHO/PAHO survey revealed an 
increasing trend in obesity in the region, and Finucane et al. (2011) estimate that between 
1980 and 2008 the average BMI for women in Central America and South America 
increased by 1.3 and 1.4 units per decade, respectively. 
This pattern is also seen in the prevalence of smoking, which is increasing in many 
low- and middle-income countries. Surveys in 14 Latin America countries reported that the 
prevalence of this behavioral risk varied from 24.1 to 66.3 percent among men, and from 
5.5 to 26.6 percent among women (Lanas et al. 2007). WHO projections suggest that by 
2020 tobacco will become the largest single cause of death, accounting for 12.3 percent of 
deaths worldwide. 
● Malignant neoplasms and chronic respiratory diseases  
The second leading cause of death from NCDs in LAC is cancer. WHO estimates that the 
percentage increase in cancer incidence by 2030, compared with 2008, will be greater in 
low-income and lower-middle-income countries (82 and 70 percent, respectively) than in 
upper-middle-income and high-income countries (58 and 40 percent, respectively). The 
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most important cancers in terms of frequency, absolute number of deaths, and mortality are 
lung, liver, and stomach cancer.  
Chronic respiratory diseases (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
emphysema, and chronic bronchitis) represent a challenge to public health in the region 
because of their frequency, severity, and economic impact. In 2011, these diseases caused 
5.3 percent of all deaths. Among these diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) and asthma are the most important, and in middle-income countries they are 
emerging as serious public health problems. Furthermore, WHO has predicted a rise in 
mortality from COPD from the fourth leading cause of death in 2004 to the third in 2030, 
largely attributable to rising tobacco consumption and biomass fuel exposure, both major 
risk factors for COPD and overwhelmingly prevalent in developing countries. 
● Diabetes 
Diabetes is responsible for 6.4 percent of all deaths in LAC but it is expected to more than 
double between 2000 and 2030, affecting an estimated 32.9 million people in the region 
(Wild et al. 2004). The number of people with diabetes is increasing due to population 
growth, aging, and the higher prevalence of obesity. Poorly controlled diabetes increases 
the risk of cardiovascular diseases, neuropathy, amputation, and blindness. 
Diabetes continues to be one of the greatest threats to health in the 21st century, and 
the number of cases will continue to rise unless prevention improves, health knowledge 
increases, and people translate this into healthier behavior.  
● Neurological conditions  
Globally, an estimated 1.5 million people died from neurological conditions in 2011. 
Among them, Alzheimer’s disease (and other forms of dementia), epilepsy, and Parkinson’s 
disease are the leading causes of death. Population aging is having a profound impact on 
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the emergence of the dementia epidemic, with Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia 
the most common underlying pathologies. Age-standardized prevalence for people older 
than 60 years varies in a narrow band of 5 to 7 percent in most world regions, with a higher 
prevalence in LAC (8.5 percent). It is expected that the number of persons living with 
dementia will double every 20 years to 65.7 million by 2030 and 115.4 million by 2050 
(Prince et al. 2013).  
Around five million people in LAC suffer from epilepsy. Different studies show that 
the median prevalence of lifetime epilepsy and active epilepsy in this region is 15.8 per 
1,000 inhabitants and 10.7 per 1,000 inhabitants per year, respectively, and that the median 
incidence is 132.2 per 100,000 inhabitants per year (Bruno et al 2013).These rates are 
relatively high compared to other regions, such as the northern hemisphere countries. 
To summarize, taking into account where LAC stands in terms of it epidemiological 
and demographic transitions, it is crucial to establish a health policy frontier that meets the 
new patterns of health of the population, which are characterized by a high prevalence of 
NCDs that share risk factors and are chronic. In this context, the health policy frontier in 
the region must include (1) public health policies to reduce the risk factors that cause NCDs 
by promoting healthy behavior; and (2) health insurance programs that offer households 
access to quality healthcare at costs that do not impoverish them.  
Consequently, policies that create environments conducive to making healthy 
choices affordable are essential to motivate people to adopt and sustain healthy behavior. In 
addition, it is fundamental to have policies that support the design of a health insurance 
system that provides healthcare coverage for long-term treatment. A comprehensive 
analysis of policies in these two areas is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the 
sections that follow focus on two important areas of the health policy discussion where the 
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tools of economic analysis are particularly useful: public health efforts to encourage 
changes toward healthier behaviors, and the structure of health insurance programs in the 
region. 
 
 
3 Noncommunicable diseases: Obesity 
This section starts with a brief introduction to the causes of obesity, then develops a simple 
model of health to assess how knowledge and self-control problems affect people’s 
behavior related to food consumption. Finally, the section explores the efficiency of policy 
interventions design to address these issues. 
  
3.1 Causes and evolution of obesity  
Humanity is changing in both size and shape. As mentioned before, there has been a 
remarkable upsurge in the number of people considered overweight or obese. The rapidity 
with which the incidence of obesity has increased suggests that genetic change on a 
population level is an unlikely cause although there must be biological factors involved 
with the obesity epidemic.2 Furthermore, not all people are becoming fat. Thus, how can we 
explain both the sudden change in human mean weight and the variability among people in 
essentially the same environments?  Power and Schulkin (2009) suggest that much of the 
increase in obesity is due to a mismatch between adaptive biological characteristics of our 
species and the modern environment, which has changed dramatically from the one under 
                                                          
2 Less than 5 percent of obese people have been shown to have identifiable hormonal, physiological, or 
molecular genetic abnormalities (Speiser et al. 2005). 
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which we evolved. According to these authors, human obesity is an inappropriate response 
to modern living conditions.  
Human obesity is an example of an adaptive biological system that is storing fat in 
the body. Most fat is stored in adipose tissue, and fat is an efficient way to store energy. 
Excess energy, consumed at one time, is stored as fat in adipose tissue in order to be 
mobilized and used at a later time when food supply is inadequate. In the past, the ability to 
store an increased amount of adipose tissue was largely constrained by the external 
environment. Life was hard and food was often scarce, hence humans evolved to respond 
and adapt to those conditions (Neel 1962).  However, the modern environment has relaxed 
many of those constraints – to some extent, food is plentiful, and obtaining it does not 
require extreme or prolonged exertion. This development, in addition to technological, 
economic, and cultural factors, has created the circumstances that allow for the increased 
numbers of overweight and obese people in the world. Thus, the current epidemic of 
obesity results from the interaction of our environment with past behaviors that are 
inappropriate in the modern world (Power and Schulkin 2009). Understanding why these 
factors lead to obesity requires analyzing the underlying biology. 
According to Power and Schulkin (2009) there are three key aspects of human 
biology that represent adaptive evolutionary changes in our physiology and metabolism that 
increase the susceptibility to obesity under modern conditions: our large (and metabolically 
expensive) brains; an increase in neonatal fatness; and an increase in maternal fatness. Our 
larger brain provides us with greatly enhanced cognitive abilities, but it also comes with 
substantial metabolic and nutrient costs. In the past, external constraints limited our ability 
to consume fat and to metabolically produce fat from excess energy intake. These 
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circumstances led to our ancestors’ enhanced ability to store fat, at least in females, and as 
fetuses and infants.  
The biology of building and maintaining our brains may explain many of the 
preferences that put us at risk of obesity now that we have used technology and culturally 
transmitted knowledge to increase access to food and decrease the exertion required to 
survive. In other words, our large brains have allowed us to construct an obesogenic 
environment. In effect, the adaptation of a larger brain appears to have been accompanied 
by the selection of physiology and behavior that make many people susceptible to obesity 
(Power and Schulkin 2009, 322). 
The factors that affect our diet, activity, and eventually our motivation to behave in 
ways that make us vulnerable to gaining excess fat cannot all be explained by biology. 
Cutler et al. (2003) suggest that the division of labor in food preparation may explain the 
increase in calories consumed during the past 50 years. They argue that since the 1960s 
there has been a revolution in the mass preparation of food, roughly comparable to the mass 
production revolution in manufactured goods that happened a century ago. Technological 
innovations have enabled food manufacturers to cook food centrally and ship it to 
consumers for rapid consumption. The switch from individual to mass preparation lowered 
the time price of food consumption and the fixed costs of food preparation. They argue that 
the lower time costs have led to increased food consumption, and ultimately increased 
weights.  
The standard economic view argues that lower prices for any good increase the 
budget set and make people better off. However, if there are market failures, such as 
asymmetric information, this result might not be true. In the case of obesity, there is 
evidence of information failure, particularly under-provision of information or lack of 
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knowledge. Beyond this market failure, there is also evidence that individuals prioritize 
immediate gratification over potential long-term negative results (Swinburn et al. 2011; 
Kremer and Glennester 2012). Self-control problems and lack of knowledge can lead 
individuals to suboptimal investment in preventive health behavior; in this context, 
lowering the time costs of food consumption may exacerbate this problem. 
 
3.2 A simple model of health, self-control and household knowledge  
A combination of imperfect information about the benefits of certain behaviors and the 
emphasis people put on immediate gratification may lead individuals to take decisions that 
do not improve their quality of life (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).  
Households select recipes based on certain prior beliefs about the effects and side-
effects of different alternatives. They are neither perfectly informed nor totally ignorant of 
the implications of their choices, although in making those choices they try to process the 
available knowledge rationally. Yet, in so doing, they are limited because the perceptions of 
the actual relationship between their actions and their health may differ for two reasons. 
First, the best knowledge available may not be entirely correct or may even be false. 
Second, there may be a gap between the state of the art and the knowledge actually used by 
households, either because household members do not know the best practices or because 
despite having access to those practices they refuse to follow the recommendations, not 
having been convinced that the health advantages of a particular good are worth the cost or 
effort. Consequently, households not only face a budget constraint but also a knowledge 
constraint (Mokyr 2002). 
Self-control issues are likely to be important as well. For example, people continue 
to overeat, probably because food is addictive and brings immediate gratification, while the 
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health costs of overconsumption occur only in the future (Cutler et al. 2003). A similar 
pattern can be observed in tobacco and alcohol use, where individuals have time-
inconsistent preferences even though they recognize the long-run trade-offs between 
current and future health. Several studies suggest that present bias leads consumers to 
underinvest in preventive behavior (Kremer and Glennerster 2012). 
For the sake of simplicity, we adapt the framework proposed by Cutler et al. (2003) 
and Mokyr (2002) to a discrete time model with three periods (youth, adulthood, and old 
age) during which a representative consumer discounts all time in the future at a higher 
discount rate, but trades off consumption in the future at the time discount rate. Such an 
individual will always want to begin a diet or an exercise routine tomorrow, or to reduce 
consumption of tobacco later (because the long-term benefits justify the lost utility 
tomorrow) but not today (because of the immediate gratification from food, tobacco, or 
leisure). 
For this model we formally use the hyperbolic discounting framework. Following 
Cutler et al. (2003), we assume that people discount the future in two ways. The first is 
standard exponential utility: for a period of time t in the future, people get    units of 
utility, where        In addition, people also make a distinction between the “current 
self” and the “future self.” This distinction is the essence of the hyperbolic model, which 
captures the property that discount rates decline (weakly) with horizon length; therefore, 
events in the near future are discounted at a higher implicit discount rate than events in a 
distant future. People discount the future self’s utility with the parameter      . 
If     , the future is considered the same as today; if     , the future is ignored. With 
probability  , people switch from being current selves to being future selves. Thus the 
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value of future consumption is probabilistic; with probability   the future utility remains 
connected to the current self, and with probability       the future utility is associated 
with the future self and is worth only   because the individual is myopic.  
At each point in time, people receive utility from consumption of both a durable 
composite commodity (C) and food, represented by caloric intake (X). Individuals also 
receive utility from a composite variable of life expectancy and health (H). In order to 
eliminate income effects, we assume utility is linear in the composite commodity and that 
income (Y) is high enough:  
              . 
The cost of food in period t is Pt, including both time and financial costs. 
Individuals are assumed to face no credit constraints, so they can lend or borrow at rate  . 
The special characteristic of this setup is that H is determined by the household production 
function: 
                         
where E is a common factor independent of the consumption basket and can be interpreted 
as the environment over which the consumer has no control, and F represents how goods 
consumed and time spent producing them are transformed into better health and longer 
lives. In particular, we propose a functional form for F given by              
  3 This 
function expresses that consumption of food (i.e., caloric intake) can be harmful to health if 
it exceeds a certain threshold. 
                                                          
3 This functional form works perfectly for food because at low levels of consumption, health improves as a 
result of food, but it worsens when the level of consumption is high. Similar results could be obtained for a 
functional form that is decreasing on the whole range, which describes the case of alcohol and tobacco 
consumption. 
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It is important to realize that the best-practice knowledge could still be far from the 
accurate truth. The parameter   is a shift factor that measures the degree to which the best 
practice grasps the true effects of caloric intake on health.   ranges from one to zero;     
means that the best practice fully captures the impact of food consumption on health, while 
at the other extreme,     means that the best practice is uninformative about the 
consequences and no one knows that food consumption has any effect on health at all (and 
thus the only reason why food is consumed is because it conveys direct utility). Moreover, 
individuals lag in their knowledge behind best-practice techniques. Therefore,   is an 
individual-specific measure of the difference between an individual’s technology and the 
best practice regarding good X. It may be best viewed as a gap between the best technique 
in society and what an individual actually believes. Consequently, the term    
   measures the degree to which the consumer is aware of and believes the mapping of food 
consumption on health, and it is defined here for simplicity as a multiplicative deviation 
from ideal priors. We expect this term to be somewhere between 0 and 1. An increase in 
      within that interval means that a consumer can do better in terms of overall utility 
simply by redeploying the available resources. If        , the consumer follows the 
best practice by some kind of ideal standard. If     but     , the consumer follows the 
best practice by the imperfect standards of the time. The possibility that         is 
especially interesting. This means that the consumer is exaggerating the perceived effect of 
the good on his or her health and thus underconsuming it to the point where its quantity is 
suboptimal.  
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Assuming that              , the individual maximizes the following 
intertemporal utility function:   
                                           
                             , 
subject to: 
   
  
   
 
  
      
    
  
   
 
  
      
      
  
   
   
  
      
     
and  
                         
First order conditions for this problem are: 
  
   
           
  
   
               
 
   
      
  
   
                  
 
      
      
  
   
  
 
  
                                          
                                       
  
   
             
 
  
                              
  
   
      
  
   
                
 
  
  
  
      
        
Since consumers have to spend their income, they will pick a certain combination of 
goods according to their taste and partial knowledge. In equilibrium consumers will choose 
  , that is, the level of food consumption in the first period, so that: 
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                 . (3.1) 
The benefit from consuming   in the first period and the effect that it produces on 
health in the present and future is on the left-hand side of the equation. This will be equal to 
the cost from lost income that is reflected in lower consumption of the composite good on 
the right-hand side of the equation. 
Similarly, in equilibrium the consumer will choose    and   , according to: 
  
 
  
 
 
   
                 
(3.2) 
   
 
  
   
(3.3) 
The following conditions on the value of the parameters are fixed in order to ensure 
desire properties in equilibrium: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(3.4) 
which is equivalent to       
    , that is the level of   
  is such that the level of health 
is decreasing in   
   And:  
 
 
 
 
  
  
(3.5) 
which is equivalent to       
   , that is, the level of   
  is such that the level of health 
is decreasing in    
 . 
In order to analyze how self-control issues and household knowledge affect the 
behavior of consumers, we study the comparative statics of the model. The results obtained, 
which are described below, are proven in Appendix 1. 
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Result 1: When there is a larger gap between an individual’s knowledge and the 
best-practice technique, which assess the impact of caloric intake on health, the 
consumption of food is higher in both the first and second period (i.e., 
   
  
   
   
  
   . 
Result 2: When individuals care more about the future, their caloric intake is lower 
in both the first and second period (i.e.,  
   
  
   
   
  
  ). 
Thus, increases in the gap (represented by ε) between the best-practice technique 
and what an individual actually believes will produce overconsumption of caloric intake in 
the first and second period (   and   ), regardless of the value of the discount parameter 
(γ). Therefore, a person’s level of health will be lower. Similarly, reductions in the discount 
parameter (γ) make consumers less forward-looking (they worry less about their future) and 
lead to more immediate consumption that is reflected in the overconsumption of caloric 
intake in the first and second periods (   and   ). Thus, our model predicts that when 
individuals have either self-control problems or knowledge constraints, they make errors 
that lead them not to behave in their own best interest or to make decisions that are unwise 
even according to their own values and preferences.4 
 
3.3 Policy implications  
This subsection analyzes interventions that may be part of an appropriate portfolio 
of government policies to combat self-control problems and knowledge constraints in order 
to prevent people from becoming overweight or obese.  
                                                          
4 Note that to prove the results we have assumed that the food price should be low enough (see equations 3.4 
and 3.5) such that food consumption is above the threshold level that maximizes health. This has certainly 
been true since the revolution in the mass preparation of food.  
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A growing literature argues that people with self-control problems impose 
negative externalities on their future selves. If we think of a person as consisting of multiple 
selves (the present self who wishes to indulge in transient pleasures versus the future self 
who wishes to be healthy, as we assume in our model), the present self’s choices can force 
externalities on the future self. Those within-person externalities are known as 
“internalities” (Whitman 2006). Individuals have a systematic tendency to pay too little 
attention to costs and benefits of decisions to their future selves. As a result, they engage in 
excessive amounts of certain activities, such as eating ‒ which is indeed one of the 
predictions of our model.  
The harm resulting from an internality might be avoided in more than one way. For 
instance, people can find ways to negotiate with each other to exploit opportunities for gain. 
Just as different people can make deals, different selves within a person can make deals; 
such deals are called “interpersonal bargains” (Whitman 2006).5 However, given the 
difficulty of internally enforcing those bargains, or contracts, it stands to reason that people 
do not always succeed in exercising self-control. This suggests a rationale for government 
interventions aimed at addressing self-control problems to induce individuals to make 
better health decisions. However, these policies should not prevent people from behaving in 
their own best interests. Ideally, these policies should create benefits for those who do not 
make reliable decisions in their best interest while be harmless to those that make reliable 
decisions.  
                                                          
5 All of us face self-control problems from time to time. Whitman (2006) argues that we can find ways to 
solve, or at least mitigate, those problems. One way is to make deals with ourselves. For instance, we can 
reward ourselves for good behavior and punish ourselves for bad behavior, make promises and advertise them 
to friends and families, or make commitments to change our own behavior. 
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In addition, if consumers do not have enough information to make informed 
choices, or if they do not fully understand or accurately perceive the risks and 
consequences of their choices, they may behave in a way that does not actually match their 
preferences or maximize their welfare. For instance, they may choose poor diets simply 
because they do not know which diets are healthy. This suggests that private decision-
making in health may lead to inefficient outcomes and points to a potential role for cost-
effective policies.  
It is worth noting that most of the interventions discussed in this subsection come 
from the United States. Applying insights from these interventions to problems in LAC 
countries is a promising area of research. 
3.3.1 Information and knowledge 
There is scarce evidence on policy interventions that attempt to reduce the knowledge gap 
in the context of obesity. The main policy response has been to enhance access to 
information, but despite the sound rationale underlying this approach, the evidence 
supporting it is mixed at best.  
A number of recent randomized control trials have found little conclusive evidence 
that the provision of nutrition information can actually change consumer behavior. Tandon 
et al. (2010) randomized the provision of information on the nutrition content of 
McDonald’s meals to a group of 100 parents and found no significant difference in the 
caloric content of the meal selected. Harnack et al. (2008) conducted a randomized 2×2 
factorial experiment in which 594 participants ordered a fast-food meal from one of four 
menus that varied with respect to whether calorie information was provided and whether 
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value-size pricing was used.6 The results showed that providing calorie information at the 
point of purchase had little effect on food selection and consumption.  
In contrast, Roberto et al. (2010) found some impact on behavior when participants 
in a study dinner (n = 303) were randomly assigned to either (1) a menu without calorie 
labels, (2) a menu with calorie labels, or (3) a menu with calorie labels and a label stating 
the recommended daily caloric intake for an average adult (calorie labels plus 
information). Participants assigned to the calorie label group consumed less than the no 
calorie labels group at the dinner, but compensated by overconsuming in the period 
following the meal. The group that received both the nutrition information and dietary 
recommendations consumed less than the other groups. 
There are at least two reasons why improving access to information may be 
insufficient to promote weight loss or improve diet. First, overeating often stems from self-
control problems that occur despite full knowledge of consequences (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 2000). Second, several informational interventions look at behaviors without 
evaluating whether the information is absorbed and understood. As our model describes, 
individuals lag in their knowledge behind best-practice techniques. Therefore, there might 
be a gap between what is recommended and the techniques actually used by people. When 
people do not understand the underlying process and cannot easily infer the benefits of a 
particular behavior, the transmission of information might be ineffective. To understand the 
benefits of health inputs, people would have to understand the complex biological process 
that determines health risks and the role that using health inputs plays in altering those 
processes. For instance, Hawthorne at el. (2006) suggest that skills for using nutritional 
                                                          
6 Value-size pricing involves structuring product prices such that the per unit cost decreases as the portion size 
increases. It has been speculated that this product pricing structure leads to greater intake because consumers 
may be prone to purchase larger-sized food items. 
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information must be built up before the information provided can be effectively used. In 
this vein, Prina and Royer (2013) measured the effect of delivering body weight report 
cards to parents of elementary school students on parental knowledge, obesity-related 
attitudes and behaviors, and BMI. In this experiment children were randomized into a 
control group and three treatment groups. What distinguished the three treatment groups 
was the received level of information. The authors found that weight report cards are an 
effective means of transmitting obesity information to parents, since they became more 
informed. However, they found no changes in parents’ action and self-reported behaviors as 
a result of having that increased information. Nor did they find any detectable effects on 
BMI or weight. The authors suggest that in order to observe meaningful behavioral 
changes, it is necessary that parental concerns about obesity change. Overall, these results 
show that the provision of weight report cards is simply not enough to induce behavioral 
changes, despite the positive effects on parental information. 
Another way to deliver information is through targeted counseling and outreach to 
populations at risk of becoming obese. These interventions can be quite diverse, and their 
effectiveness in influencing dietary behavior may depend on programmatic features such as 
setting (primary care facilities versus other types of facilities), community-based group or 
individual counseling, interview style (e.g., motivational), and medium of communication 
(e.g., tailored feedback through e-mail). The interventions discussed here involve programs 
that have some element of personal contact and tailoring. These programs can also be 
combined with behavioral interventions, which are strategies to help people acquire skills, 
motivation, and support to change diet and exercise patterns. Indeed, behavioral economics 
suggests that feedback on one’s progress toward achieving a goal can increase both 
motivation to counteract bounded willpower and awareness of one’s health behaviors 
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(Luoto and Carman 2014). For instance, a recent randomized two-year trial that tested the 
role of feedback through SMS messages found that daily messages enhanced adherence to 
self-monitoring and increased weight loss (Burke et al. 2012). 
Several randomized control trials have demonstrated that these types of programs 
can be an effective way to improve dietary consumptions and weight loss. Tailoring has 
generally been found to be more successful than nontailored methods in changing dietary 
behavior (Campbell et al. 1994; Delichatsios et al. 2001; Kristal et al. 2000). In a study 
conducted by Tuomilehto et al. (2001) participants were randomly assigned to one group 
that received individualized counseling aimed at reducing weight, increasing physical 
activity, and participating in sessions with nutritionists (intervention group), and another 
group that only received general information about diet and exercise (control group). They 
found that the net weight loss of the intervention group was 3.5±5.5 kg while that of the 
control group was 0.8±4.4 kg. Hardcastle et al. (2008) conducted a randomized trial to 
compare a counseling intervention with a more standard intervention (a health promotion 
leaflet) among 334 mostly obese patients. Individuals were randomized into either an 
intervention group that received standard exercise and nutrition information plus up to five 
face-to-face counseling sessions over six months, or into a control group that only received 
the standard information. The results showed that in the sixth month, participants in the 
intervention group were more active, particularly with respect to walking, and had reduced 
weight, blood pressure and cholesterol, but had not changed their diet, compared with the 
control group. 
Increasingly, cost-conscious providers are exploring ways to deliver tailored 
interventions that do not incur the same substantial costs as personal sessions. Some 
examples of these interventions include messaging by telephone, email, and SMS, and 
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computer-assisted counseling. In particular, interventions using telephone counseling have 
seen significant improvements in diet, physical activity, and weight loss. Furthermore, 
these outcomes were more likely to be maintained over time. In a study by Patrick et al. 
(2009), participants were randomly assigned to one of two recipient groups over 16 weeks: 
(1) one group that received monthly printed materials about weight control (comparison 
group); and (2) a second group that was subject to an intervention that included 
personalized SMS and MMS messages sent two to five times daily, printed materials, and 
brief monthly phone calls from a health counselor (intervention group). The results showed 
that at the end of four months, the intervention group lost more weight than the comparison 
group.  
 
3.3.2 Present bias and behavioral economics 
Policies addressing consumer behavior will not achieve a first-best outcome if they do not 
account for consumers’ time inconsistency. Our model shows that consumers with time-
inconsistent preferences may well spend more than is optimal on food and, in consequence, 
make suboptimal decisions. Time-inconsistent consumers will have a demand for 
commitment mechanisms that can be used to induce more appropriate behavior in the 
present. Unfortunately, the private market only imperfectly provides such self-control 
mechanisms (Gruber 2002). As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to truly commit 
oneself to not overeat or to maintain an exercise routine.  
In light of the findings that people regularly deviate from a rational model of 
behavior, and that such deviations can hurt their own long-term interests, behavioral 
economics has focused on developing interventions that expressly take such decision-
making tendencies into account. Behavioral economists have proposed a new approach 
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‒termed “libertarian paternalistic” ‒ that operates via “nudging” individual behavior toward 
self-interest. The libertarian descriptor refers to the fact that individuals should be allowed 
to make their own choices. The essence of this approach is that the same decision errors 
that often result in people inadvertently harming themselves can instead help them by 
rearranging the details of their decisions without formally restricting or otherwise 
significantly altering their choice sets (Luoto and Carman 2014).  
Along these lines, Downs et al. (2009, 2010) proposed an intervention to deal with 
present-biased preferences as well as the status quo bias. The intervention included the 
design of a menu featuring healthy options on the front page of a menu and unhealthy 
options at the back. Specifically, participants were instructed to select a sandwich from a 
menu that varied in terms of providing (or not) caloric recommendations and information as 
well as the relative convenience of healthy sandwich options. The convenience 
manipulation played on present-bias preferences by adding a small and immediate 
additional cost to finding the unhealthy options (having to open the menu to the back), 
which in theory should make the relative costs and benefits of the healthy and unhealthy 
options more equal. The results suggested that highlighting the healthy options can improve 
people’s choices to select more healthy fare. Those who received the menu highlighting 
healthy fare were 48 percent more likely to purchase a low-calorie sandwich relative to the 
standard menu that had a mix of healthy and unhealthy options. This study further tested 
the ability of caloric information to affect orders and found no effect. 
Another way to “nudge” people to make better dietary choices is by providing 
financial incentives.7 These incentives can potentially increase the perceived benefit of 
                                                          
7 Certain interventions could be viewed as neoclassical or behavioral, depending on the context. One could 
argue that financial incentives are clearly in the realm of neoclassical economics. However, incentives can 
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substituting healthier foods in the long term, in this way lessening the bias toward present 
preferences. An alternative hypothesis is that motivation encourages “habit formation.” In 
other words, providing incentives to healthy behaviors such as exercising may increase the 
future utility of such behaviors. If the marginal utility of consumption today is positively 
correlated with historical consumption, then the period in which people were given 
financial incentives to go to the gym could also induce them to go to the gym more often in 
the future, leading to habit formation (Charness and Gneezy 2009). However, studies 
indicate that, in some situations, providing rewards may be counterproductive, as providing 
an extrinsic motivation for a task or activity may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Fishbach 
and Trope 2005; Lepper et al. 1973; Deci 1972).  
Alternatively, behavioral interventions often make use of incentives based on 
lotteries. Consistent with prospect theory, a small probability of a large reward may be 
more motivating than a certain award of the same expected value (Luoto and Carman 
2014).  
Commitment mechanisms are another way to help address the problem of time 
inconsistency. Broadly, a commitment mechanism is an arrangement entered into by an 
individual with the aim of helping fulfill a plan for future behavior that would otherwise be 
difficult owing to intrapersonal conflict stemming from, for example, a lack of self-control 
(Bryan et al. 2010). An example of a commitment mechanism would be the payment of a 
gym membership by the month rather than by the day in order to increase the cost of 
skipping a session. These types of mechanisms can be used to help address the problem of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
also be used to address behavioral biases, either by raising the salience of a desired behavior or by addressing 
issues of self-control. In such instances, the incentives can be classified also as a behavioral tool (Luoto and 
Carman 2014). 
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time inconsistency by allowing a present self to make decisions on behalf of its future self 
in cases when the two selves may differ in their preferences. 
The empirical literature regarding the provision of financial incentives and 
commitment mechanisms among obese people suggests that such incentives can be 
effective in promoting dietary change in the short term. For instance, Volpp et al. (2008) 
conducted a randomized control trial that involved the assignment of healthy volunteers to 
one of three types of programs: (1) a weight-monitoring program involving monthly weigh-
ins, which acted as the control group; (2) the same program with one of two financial 
incentive plans in the form of a lottery (participants who met the weight loss target had a 1 
in 5 chance each day of winning a small reward, and a 1 in 100 chance of winning a large 
reward); and (3) standard treatment plus a commitment contract (participants put their own 
money at risk, which they would lose if they failed to lose weight). The results showed that 
the incentive group lost significantly more weight than the control group after 16 weeks. 
However, behavior reverted back to almost exactly what it was initially once the incentives 
were dropped, and substantial weight was regained.  Finkelstein et al. (2007) found that, 
over a three-month period, participants offered $14 per percentage point of weight loss lost 
4.7 pounds, and participants offered $7 per percentage point of weight loss lost 3 pounds 
compared with 2 pounds among control group participants (see Wall et al. 2006 for a 
systematic review).  
There is also literature on financial incentives for gym attendance. Charness and 
Gneezy (2009) conducted two randomized field experiments that offered incentives for 
university students to attend a gym a number of times during one month. In the first 
experiment, they compared the behavior of three groups. All groups were given a handout 
regarding the benefits of exercise. One group received no benefits; people in the other two 
43 
 
groups were paid $25 to attend the gym once in a week, and people in one of these two 
groups were then paid an additional $100 to attend the gym eight more times in the 
following four weeks. In the second experiment, people were invited to a first meeting in 
which biometric measures were taken and handouts distributed regarding the benefits of 
exercise. Participants were paid $75 for attending and were then invited to come twice 
more. They were promised $50 for each of the two later meetings. They were randomly 
assigned to three groups: one with no additional requirements, a second that required 
attending the gym once during the one-month intervention period, and a third that required 
attending the gym eight times in the same period. The results showed a positive effect from 
paying people to go to the gym eight times in a month, as the rate of gym visits after the 
intervention increased significantly in both experiments. The study also found 
improvements in health indicators such as weight, waist size, and pulse rate. The authors 
concluded that merely providing information about the benefits of exercise or even 
requiring one gym visit did not have much of an effect.  
Using a field intervention to exogenously shift preferences toward gym attendance 
in a student sample, Acland and Levy (2013) confirmed the results found by Charness and 
Gneezy (2009) – that is, people do establish a significant exercise habit, but only in the 
short run.  
Several longer-term studies, such as Kramer et al. (1986) and Jeffery and Wing 
(1995), did not find any effects on weight loss among study participants after 30 months of 
treatment.  Furthermore, a meta-analysis of nine studies conducted by Paul-Ebhohimhen 
and Avenell (2008) found no significant effect of financial incentives on weight loss or 
maintenance at 12 and 18 months.  
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In sum, empirical evidence seems to suggest that once incentives are taken away, 
individuals are likely to return to their normal behavior, exhibiting bounded willpower and 
ignoring the future benefits of healthy behaviors. Future research should examine ways to 
use incentives to induce long-term weight loss and maintenance. This challenge is not 
unique to ﬁnancial incentive-based programs; it is a challenge for weight-loss programs in 
general. 
 
3.3.3 Price interventions 
Government could turn to second-best policies that involve “sin” taxes and 
subsidies to address these biases and discourage the consumption of unhealthy food. In this 
case, the intervention could be warranted, on the one hand, by the damage that being 
overweight or obese does to the individuals themselves (Gruber 2002). The individual’s 
long-run self recognizes that he or she will overeat and would like to reduce consumption 
of food. But without the help of government or a legal commitment mechanism, the 
person’s current self is unable to do so. On the other hand, obese individuals have more 
expensive healthcare costs for which they do not fully pay. Instead these costs are shared 
among all of those in a common insurance market. A tax would force obese individuals to 
bear the full cost of their unhealthy habits and would correct the externality they currently 
impose on others (Luoto and Carman 2014). Unfortunately, when the population is 
heterogeneous and a large group makes reliable decisions in their best interest, this type of 
intervention would be harmful to them.  
“Sin” taxes are designed to induce people to make better personal health decisions. 
By raising the price of the unhealthy item, government can make the overconsumption of 
food more costly for today’s self, helping achieve what the individual’s long-term self 
45 
 
would desire by decreasing the consumption of food today. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) 
discuss “optimal sin taxes” designed to correct self-control problems, using the specific 
example of overeating. They show that imposing seemingly large sin taxes on unhealthy 
items while lowering taxes on other items may not hurt rational consumers by much 
(relative to the optimal “Ramsey” taxes), and at the same time may create significant 
benefits for those who overconsume the unhealthy items due to self-control problems.  
In general, the empirical literature documents that lowering the price of healthy 
foods and raising the price of less-healthy alternatives have the potential to influence 
purchases toward healthier food options, particularly when large purchases are involved 
(Powell and Chaloupka 2009). 8 For instance, Cecchini et al. (2010) used a simulation 
based on pricing studies to predict that changes in relative prices between healthy and 
unhealthy foods lead to reductions in fat consumption by 0.4 to 0.6 percent and increases in 
fiber consumption by 3.6 to 10.4 percent. Using a laboratory experiment, Epstein et al. 
(2010) examined the effects of increasing the price of high-calorie-for-nutrient foods or 
reducing the price of low-calorie-for-nutrient foods by 12.5 and 25 percent, respectively, on 
mothers’ purchases of 68 common foods and drinks. They found that taxing less-healthy 
foods with low nutrient density reduced caloric intake and reduced the proportion of fat 
while increasing the proportion of protein purchased.  
Despite this suggestive evidence, there are few studies that have attempted to 
measure the effects of taxation on health outcomes. One exception is the study by 
Miljkovic and Nganje (2008) that shows that a $1 increase in the price of sugar is 
                                                          
8 Experience with tobacco tax regulation further underscores the power of price changes to influence 
purchasing behavior and, ultimately, public health (Gruber 2002). 
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associated with a 0.20 and 0.33 percentage point reduction in the probability of being 
overweight or obese, respectively (see also Powell et al. 2007). 
There are some caveats that should be taken into account when these policies are 
analyzed. First, people may respond to the price change by substituting the taxed unhealthy 
item with another unhealthy item that is not included in the policy. Fletcher et al. (2010) 
investigated the potential of soft drink taxes to combat rising levels of adolescent obesity. 
Their results suggest that taxation leads to a moderate reduction in soft drink consumption, 
but that this reduction is completely offset by increases in consumption of other high-
calorie drinks.  Schroeter et al. (2008) shows that there are plausible scenarios where taxes 
on certain types of food (e.g., food away from home) could lead to increases in body weight 
simply due to substitution among types of food. Second, if people do not understand the 
risk of obesity, these kinds of policies may be less successful because of unintended 
consequences. For example, Waterlander et al. (2012) found that although offering 
subsidies on healthy foods increases the amounts purchased, the proportion of healthy 
foods to total purchases remained unchanged, as people used those savings to purchase 
more calories overall.  
In sum, while evidence has revealed increases in purchases of healthier foods when 
the prices of such foods are reduced, as well as reductions in purchases of less-healthy 
foods when their prices are increased, more research is needed on the impact of these 
policies on health outcomes and on what pricing strategies would be optimal for addressing 
excess food consumption and rising rates of obesity. For example, if the goal is to decrease 
caloric intake, is it better to subsidize healthy foods, tax unhealthy foods, or implement 
both a tax and a subsidy policy? This answer remains unknown. 
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4 The economics of health insurance programs 
According to demographic and epidemiological transitions, LAC has become increasingly 
vulnerable to the impact of NCDs. Improved access to healthcare, early detection, and 
timely treatment constitute an effective approach to reducing the impact of NCDs (Alwan 
2011).  In this context, the provision of health insurance plays an important role. This 
section focuses on health insurance programs, first discussing the rationales for creating 
health insurance programs and then briefly setting out the choices that define particular 
health insurance programs. 
 
4.1 The rationale of health insurance  
Health is a person’s multidimensional state of physical and psychological well-being. The 
health that people can expect to experience in any given year is a function of their health 
stock, the probabilities with which they are hit by health shocks, and the nature and quality 
of the healthcare they would receive. Health shocks are a troubling source of risk for all 
households because if such shocks come to pass, households must either obtain care and 
pay high out-of-pocket fees or forgo care and suffer the physical and economic 
consequences of ill health. 
Some households attempt to protect themselves against the burden of future health 
shocks by purchasing health insurance, which is a contract where the household agrees to 
pay a fee or premium in exchange for the promise of indemnities, or financial assistance 
with paying healthcare bills, when a family member experience a covered health shock. For 
households with the financial means to pay for care when hit by shocks, such contracts 
reduce vulnerability to financial shocks and poverty. For those who would have forgone 
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care when hit by health shocks, such contracts improve their health by allowing them to 
obtain healthcare. 
If insurance markets were free of information problems and if insurance transactions 
were costless to carry out, insurers would come forward to supply health insurance to many 
households while charging premiums that households are willing to pay. They could supply 
insurance at such premiums while covering costs, because they would benefit from risk 
pooling.9 The existence of a well-functioning health insurance market would allow for a 
redistribution of income from those who remain healthy to those who become sick, while 
leaving everyone better off because even those who ultimately remain healthy would 
benefit (ex-ante) from reduced risk.  
However, markets are unlikely to yield high-quality and efficient healthcare in the 
absence of intervention for several reasons. Most households may not be sufficiently 
forward-looking, so the cost of possible out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures receives 
little weight in current consumption decisions. They also lack expert medical knowledge 
and thus have much less information than providers about the quality and necessity of the 
care provided. Providers might take advantage of this asymmetry of information by 
charging high fees for low-quality care, and financial market limitations can render it 
difficult for healthcare providers to manage stocks of medicines and supplies in the face of 
randomly fluctuating demands for care and inflows of user-fee revenue. Failure of 
insurance markets may therefore be understood as contributing to two critical symptoms of 
the failure of the healthcare system in the absence of intervention: low rates of healthcare 
utilization and high rates of impoverishment among those who obtain care. 
                                                          
9 Insurers engage in risk pooling when they take on liability for the cost of any necessary healthcare for many 
people, only some of whom will in fact be struck by health shocks in a given year 
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The logic of health insurance market failures suggests that where households must 
pay significant user fees for healthcare, governments may be able to increase healthcare 
utilization and reduce the financial burden associated with care by introducing new health 
insurance programs (Schaffner 2013). As always, while logic suggests the potential for 
health insurance programs to generate benefits at low cost, it does not guarantee that in 
practice the benefits will be large and the cost low. The nature and magnitude of the impact 
of such programs is likely to depend on the details of program design, as will be discussed 
in the following subsection. 
 
4.2 Design of health insurance programs 
Health insurance programs have the potential to improve healthcare quality and efficiency 
by creating a new institutional interface between healthcare consumers and suppliers, which 
improves the governance of healthcare management. The new institutional arrangements 
can help healthcare consumers coordinate their demands and negotiate better contractual 
arrangements. Further efficiency gains may be obtained when health insurance programs 
encourage households to make more efficient use of the healthcare system. For instance, by 
covering primary care visits, health insurance can encourage households to enter the 
healthcare system at an earlier stage of illness, when treatment is more effective and less 
costly (Schaffner 2013). 
However, the potential benefits of health insurance programs depend on the details 
of the program design. Health insurance programs differ greatly in their coverage. Some 
programs offer coverage for catastrophic health shocks that are life-threatening and require 
hospitalization or costly medication. Other programs offer coverage for the smaller and 
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more frequent costs of primary healthcare services, including the diagnosis and treatment of 
common illnesses.  
Within any category of covered health shocks and treatments, the generosity of 
coverage is defined by deductibles, coinsurance rates, and caps on out-of-pocket spending 
or indemnity payments. In some programs, participants must pay out of pocket for 
healthcare costs up to specified deductible levels (per health shock episode or per year)10 
before additional costs are covered by indemnities, Other programs offer first dollar 
coverage (i.e., zero deductible). Very generous programs might cover 100 percent of 
healthcare costs beyond the deductible level, while others might cover only 60 percent, 
thereby imposing a 40 percent coinsurance rate on participants. Some programs impose 
per-episode out-of-pocket payments caps, promising to cover any costs in excess of that 
cap, while others impose insurer payment caps, requiring participants to cover any cost 
over the cap. In addition, programs differ in the levels of fees that participants pay, and in 
how those fees vary across income levels or demographic characteristics.  
A final distinguishing design feature is whether participation is mandatory or 
voluntary. Many of the oldest health insurance programs in developing countries are 
mandatory for all formal sector workers (and their families). The mandate is enforced by 
using payroll taxes to deduct premiums before workers receive their pay. In LAC, 
mandatory programs were introduced as far back as the 1930s and cover over half of the 
population (see Section 5). In poorer countries, however, very few people work in the 
formal sector, and mandatory programs might cover as little as 10 percent of the 
                                                          
10 Deductible levels are minimum amounts of expenditure that the insured person must bear before the insurer 
subsidizes care. 
51 
 
population. In programs targeting the many developing-country households outside the 
formal sector, participation is voluntary (Schaffner 2013). 
 
 
 
5 Institutional overview of health insurance programs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
The organization and supply of health insurance varies widely across countries.  While 
most high-income countries have evolved toward the public provision of health insurance, 
attained near-universal coverage and increased the degree of financial risk protection, 
access to care and risk protection in middle-income countries remains a policy concern. In 
these countries, targeted safety net programs complement a small private insurance market, 
limiting coverage to selected benefits and groups. Private insurance markets are generally 
fragmented, and the use of regulatory instruments, such as risk adjustment, remains limited 
(McGuire 2012). 
Regarding LAC, most countries have reformed their healthcare system. These 
reforms have been focused mainly on promoting financial, structural, and institutional 
changes in health systems while much less attention has been devoted to enhancing the 
performance of health systems with the focus on reducing inequities in health conditions 
and access to healthcare (PAHO 2002, 138).   In a large majority of countries a tripartite 
healthcare system has emerged with diverse roles of the public, social insurance, and 
private sectors, varying degrees of population coverage and separation of functions (Mesa-
Lago 2008). 
52 
 
Social insurance plays an important role in the provision of health insurance in the 
region. Its design is based on the Bismarck model, where social insurance entitlements are 
proportional to the mandatory contributions made by workers and their employers (Ribe et 
al. 2012). Under this design, the coverage is limited by the method of financing. While all 
workers are exposed to the risks, even under full compliance, only those in the formal 
sector are actually insured, hence self-employed workers and those engaged with firms 
under nonsalaried contracts are left out (Levy 2008). 
The public sector plays a secondary role vis-à-vis social insurance, as it has 
insufficient resources and limited access, and provides low-quality services. Finally, there 
is a significant variety of private entities and plans partly because health reforms have 
stimulated the expansion and competition of the private sector. However, this expansion 
has had negative effects on equity because:  
(i) Private insurance firms and providers practice risk selection (cream skimming), 
excluding or charging higher premiums to those who either suffer chronic diseases 
or are elderly, and as a consequence those enduring greater risk must pay higher 
copayments that they often cannot afford;  
(ii) Competition is centered on the most attractive groups and avoids the least attractive 
groups – including the elderly or people with high risk, chronic disease, or 
insufficient income to finance needs derived from their epidemiological profile – 
who are left to the public sector;  
(iii) Segmentation increases in countries where social insurance is not integrated with 
the public sector and only covers the middle-income formal stratum (Mesa-Lago 
2008; Giordano and Colina 2000). 
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5.1 Health insurance coverage 
Although the region lacks historical statistical series’ on coverage, Table 6, based on Mesa-
Lago (2008), compiles estimates of the percentage of the total population covered in 19 
countries. Whenever possible, the table compares the year prior to the reforms with the 
most recent year available. In the table, the covered population is divided into the three 
sectors (public, social insurance, and private) and the category of “others” (separate 
schemes such as the armed forces, policemen, civil servants, etc.). Since several problems 
affect the accuracy of the estimates, results should be interpreted with caution.  
Considering the region as a whole, the estimated regional weighted average of the 
total population covered by social insurance before and after the reform (excluding the 
public systems of Brazil and Cuba) increased from 43 to 52 percent from 1980–90 but 
decreased to 41 percent in 2001. These averages are below the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) minimum norm of 75 percent coverage of the resident population. 
However an undetermined portion of the population has access to public sector services, 
and to a lesser extent is covered by the private sector (3.8 percent of the population) and the 
“other” category of systems mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
The population covered with social insurance varies widely within the region. There 
are countries that cover almost the entire population (up to 86 percent) through social 
insurance, but there are others where social insurance covers only a small minority, ranging 
from 0.5 percent in Haiti to 16 percent in Uruguay. The low health coverage in some 
countries may be attributed to legal or practical exclusion of the self-employed, agricultural 
workers, and informal workers. Hence, the degree of coverage is directly related to both the 
level of socioeconomic development and the proportion of the labor force that is formal, 
whereas it is inversely related to poverty incidence (Mesa-Lago 2008). 
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 Table 6  Health care coverage/access in Latin America countries (percent) 
Countries 
 
Total population 
 
Labor forceb 
 
Years Public 
Social 
insurance 
Private Othersa Total 
 
Years Coverage 
Argentina   1991 36.4 57.6 4.6 1.4 100.0   1997 63.9 
    2001 37.4 54.4 7.9 0.3 100.0   2001 56.2 
Bolivia   1997 30.0 25.8 10.5 0 66.3   1997 17.4 
                  2002 15.2 
Brazil   1998 75.5 0 24.5 n.a. 100.0   
n.a. n.a. 
    2003 75.5 0 24.5 n.a. 100.0   
Chile   1984 83.4 3.1 13.5 100.0   1996 86.2 
    2003 72.1 16.3 11.6 100.0   2000 87.3 
Colombia   1993 50.0 23.7 
n.a. n.a. 
73.6   
n.a. n.a. 
    2002 46.7 53.3c 100.0c   
Costa Rica   1994 0 86.2 13.8 0 100.0   
n.a. n.a. 
    2003 0 86.8 13.2 0 100.0   
Dominican 
Republic 
  2000 60.0 7.0 12.0 5.0 84.0   n.a. n.a. 
Ecuador   1994 28.0 18.0 20.0 7.0 73.0   1994 23.1 
    2004 41.6 16.5 1.7 1.0 60.8   1998 33.2 
El 
Salvador 
  2001 40.0 15.8 1.5 n.a. 57.3   n.a. n.a. 
Guatemala   1995 30.0 16.6 12.0 n.a. 58.6   2000 26.0 
    2000 26.0 16.6 30.0 n.a. 72.6       
Haiti   2000 21.0 0.5 38.0 1.0 60.5   n.a. n.a. 
Honduras   2000 52.0 11.7 1.5 n.a. 65.2   n.a. n.a. 
Mexico   1985 47.7 41.8 
n.a. 
10.5 100.0   n.a. n.a. 
    2002 41.8 45.3 12.9 100.0   1998   
Nicaragua   1991 n.a. 18.3 
n.a. 
n.a. n.a.   2001 14.8 
    2001 60.0 7.9 0.5 68.4     16.6 
Panama   1996 39.9 61.1 I 0 100.0   
n.a. n.a. 
    2004 35.4 64.6 I 0 100.0   
Paraguay   1999 42.0 12.4 6.3 1.2 62.0   
n.a. n.a. 
    2001 33.3 12.4 7.0 n.a. 52.7   
Peru   2002 30.0 26.0 12.0 3.0 71.0   1994 28.4 
                  2000 24.2 
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Uruguay   1987 27.2 15.8 30.8 13.9 87.7   
n.a. n.a. 
    2003 38.7 15.9 34.7 7.9 97.2   
Venezuela   2000 
See 
footnote 
d 
38.4 
See footnote 
d 
See 
footnote d 
See 
footnote d 
  
n.a. n.a. 
    2004 
See 
footnote 
d 
38.3 
See footnote 
d 
See 
footnote d 
See 
footnote d    
Source: Mesa-Lago (2008). 
n.a. = non-available.  
a In some countries, armed forces, policemen, civil servants, and other separate schemes.  
b Salaried employers, large and small enterprises, domestic servants, and other separate schemes.  
c Of the 53.3 percent affiliated, 29 percent were in the contributory regime and 24.3 percent in the subsidized regime. 
The remaining 46.7 percent are either connected  (vinculados) to public hospitals, but the total is questionable due to 
duplication in coverage and unknown actual access of vinculados is unknown. 
d Lack of reliable data on public, private, and others impeded an estimation of total.  
 
The public sector does not often fulfill the legal mandate of free service to the poor and 
uninsured in most LAC countries, so a significant part of the population is left without 
protection. In terms of private out-of-pocket expenditure in health as a share of national 
health expenditure, the regional average of around 48 percent in 2011 is still far from the 
target of 23 percent, which is the level of countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development characterized as having universal coverage (PAHO 2012).  
Nonsalaried and informal workers represent a major challenge for social health 
insurance, since under contributory social insurance there is no possibility of extending 
coverage to them precisely because they are outside the formal sector. Over the last two 
decades some LAC countries have gradually created programs to provide the uninsured 
with at least a subset of health benefits adjusted to the epidemiological and local needs of 
users (see Section 7). 
 In sum, over the past three decades the region has seen important reforms that 
sought to improve health systems. However, the norm is still mixed and fragmented models 
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in which contributory and noncontributory health insurance programs coexist. One of the 
implications of this situation is low financial protection for individuals. In addition, the 
increase in informal labor poses great challenges to achieving universal healthcare 
coverage. This is especially relevant taking into account the high prevalence of NCDs, 
which require effective health insurance programs that provide coverage for long-term 
treatment.  
6 The coverage of health insurance: A theoretical framework  
As previously mentioned, since the second half of the 20th century the trend in LAC has 
been toward labor-based social insurance systems restricted to salaried workers. This 
section presents a theoretical framework proposed by Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) 
to assess the relationship between health insurance and the labor market.  
 In most of the informality literature, workers’ decisions play no role in determining 
the equilibrium in the labor market. Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) provide a model 
where workers have nonpecuniary preferences for the sector in which they work. Part of 
these nonpecuniary preferences is health insurance plans provided by formal firms. We 
assume that formal workers are covered by health insurance and informal workers are not. 
Informal workers can access healthcare resorting to either private health insurance or public 
hospitals. Thus, any policy that affects workers’ health insurance may produce changes in 
workers’ behaviour, affecting the size of the formal sector and consequently the quantity of 
workers covered by insurance.  
 Specifically, Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) assume that firms produce a 
homogenous good that is traded in a perfectly competitive market using managerial talent 
(m) and homogenous units of labor (l). In the model, very small firms (i.e., those with 
managerial talent m close to 0) operate informally because of the fixed cost that they would 
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have to incur in order to operate formally. As result, there is size dualism: small firms 
operate informally while large firms operate formally. In equilibrium, whenever there are 
both formal and informal firms, there is a unique cut-off point (  ) that satisfies:   
               
where    and     are the benefit perceived by the formal and informal firm, respectively. 
Thus, firms with managerial talent     choose to operate informally, while firms with 
managerial talent     choose to operate formally. (The complete derivation of the 
model is in Appendix 2.) 
Each worker, endowed with l units of homogenous labor, has to choose whether to 
sell his or her labor to a firm that operates either formally or informally.11 In the first case, 
workers receive    per unit of labor plus mandated social benefits, which for simplicity 
sake we equate to health insurance package     . In the second case, workers receive only 
   per unit of labor and we assume they receive healthcare only in public hospitals     . 
In addition, we assume that              
The utility of a worker who chooses to work in the formal sector is:  
                   , 
where   is a fixed cost for working in the formal sector, such as unemployment insurance. 
The expected utility of a worker who chooses to work in the informal sector is:  
                        
where   is the probability that a firm is caught operating informally, in which case workers 
do not receive their payment.  
                                                          
11 Olson (1993), cited in Gruber (2000), provides supportive evidence of the presence of worker’s self-
selection in the United States. He finds that workers with greater-than-expected health needs (e.g., wives 
whose husbands do not have health insurance, and who have less healthy children) self-select into firms that 
provide health benefits.  
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Under certain conditions there is a unique cut-off point (    that determines that 
workers with low levels of human capital will work in the informal sector and those with 
high levels of human capital will be employed in the formal sector. This cut-off point is 
determined by: 
                         
and solving for l  we obtain: 
   
       
          
    (6.1) 
Workers with      prefer to work in the formal sector, while workers with      operate 
informally (see Appendix 2 for further details). This is the first important result in terms of 
health:  
Result 1: Poor, unskilled workers will be in the informal sector and will only have 
public health coverage, while workers with high levels of human capital will be employed 
in the formal sector and receive health insurance.12  
The equilibrium analysis is restricted to the cases where there are firms and workers 
operating in both the formal and informal sectors. An equilibrium is then a vector of wages 
       , supply of labor    
    
    and demand for labor (  
    
   such that there is market-
clearing in both the formal     and informal     labor markets. 
We will analyze the effect of an improvement in health insurance package that 
formal worker receives, which is reflected by an increase in   . At the prevailing wage 
levels, the utility of working in the formal sector increases while the utility of working in 
the informal sector remains constant. This, in turn, will reduce the formality cut-off point 
                                                          
12 This result is present in Latin America data. See, for example, Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012). 
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for workers (in equation 6.1,       ) decreases); hence more individuals would prefer 
to work in the formal sector. Thus the curve of equilibrium points in the formal sector 
   
    
   shifts downward, while the curve of equilibrium points in the informal sector 
   
    
   shifts to the right. Since the total supply of labor represented by workers above 
the original cut-off point increases, at the prevailing wage levels there is an excess supply 
in the formal sector. This means that, for a given informal wage, equilibrium in the formal 
sector is only achieved if formal wages go down. The same reasoning applies to the 
informal sector. Finally, since neither the total supply of labor (the total quantity of labor is 
supplied inelastically) nor the total demand of labor has changed, the function    
    
  
  
    
   representing the wage levels that align the total supply of labor with total demand 
for labor remains the same.  
We illustrate these changes in Figure 2, where the downward sloping curve 
represents the locus of wages where total labor demand is equal to total labor supply.13 
While total labor demand and supply are equal along this curve, their composition is not. 
Each point maps to a different    
    
    
    
   vector. The upward sloping curves, i.e., the 
functions   
    
  for      , show the wage pairs that would align labor demand and 
supply within each sector of the economy.  
In the new equilibrium    
     
    the informal wage increases while the formal 
wage decreases. Thus, this policy would indirectly benefit informal workers through the 
increase in their wages. Managerial decisions also change. At the new wage levels, the 
managerial ability cut-off point is also lower than in the previous equilibrium. Therefore, 
more firms choose to operate formally. Moreover, the firms that originally were operating 
                                                          
13 The assumption that the derivative of total labor demand with respect to wages is negative guarantees that 
the curve is downward sloping. 
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formally increase their total labor demand while those that remain in the informal sector 
reduce their total labor demand. Thus, we have the following result: 
Result 2: An improvement in health insurance package increases the size of the 
formal sector, decreases the formal wage, and increases the informal wage, thus improving 
the utility of poor unskilled workers who choose the informal sector.  
Figure 2 Comparative statics 
 
                                               Source: Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) 
An increase in the quality of public hospitals,14 represented by an increase in   , 
will also affect the market labor. At the initial wage levels, the utility of working in the 
informal sector increases while the utility of working in the formal sector remains constant, 
which increases the formality cut-off point for workers (in equation 6.1,       
increases); hence more individuals would prefer to work in the informal sector. Thus, the 
curve of equilibrium points in the informal sector    
    
   shifts to the left and the curve 
                                                          
14 This also can be interpreted as an expansion of the benefits or the coverage provided by public healthcare. 
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of equilibrium points in the formal sector    
    
   shifts upward. Since the total supply of 
labor represented by workers below the original cut-off point increases, at the prevailing 
wage levels there is an excess supply in the informal sector. For a given formal wage, 
equilibrium in the informal sector is only achieved if informal wages decrease. The same 
reasoning applies to the formal sector. At the new wage levels, the managerial ability cut-
off point is higher than in the previous equilibrium, hence the size of the informal sector 
increases. In sum, we obtain the following result: 
Result 3: An increase in the quality of public hospitals, which reduces the difference 
in health services that formal workers received through social health insurance relative to 
uninsured informal workers, increases the size of the informal sector and decreases the 
wages of this sector, while increasing the wages of the formal sector.  
This simple model shows that employment-based health insurance interferes with 
the functioning of the labor market. This is a relevant result for policymakers, since 
changes in the provision of public healthcare may have unintended consequences, distorting 
workers’ incentives to operate in the informal sector.  
 
7 The challenges of expanding health insurance coverage 
As the magnitude of NCDs continues to accelerate, the pressing need for access to quality 
healthcare is increasingly recognized. There are three ways of moving toward increasing 
financial accessibility to healthcare: (1) by increasing breadth (who is insured), (2) by 
increasing depth (which benefits are covered), and (3) by increasing height (what 
proportion of the cost is covered). This subsection investigates the first approach to 
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increasing accessibility, which involves expanding health insurance to poor, unskilled 
workers in the informal sector. 
LAC countries face the challenge of expanding health insurance coverage in a 
scenario in which a large share of the labor force is employed in the informal sector. There 
is little agreement among countries as to how best to expand coverage to this sector. Under 
social health insurance there is no possibility of extending coverage to nonsalaried workers. 
As a result, separate insurance programs adjusted to epidemiological needs should be 
available for those persons who are not eligible for health insurance through employment.  
Over the years, and particularly since the mid-1990s, governments have gradually 
created programs to provide the uninsured with at least a subset of the benefits that salaried 
workers receive through social health insurance. These health programs have expanded 
markedly in scope, quality, budget, and coverage.  
One of the most notable initiatives is Mexico’s Seguro Popular. Mexico’s social 
security system only covers about 45 percent of the population, namely formally registered 
wage workers and their dependents (Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier 2011). Seguro 
Popular was introduced in 2002 with the aim of expanding health insurance coverage to 
individuals without social security. In principle, beneficiaries pay contributions according 
to their income decile, but in practice very few beneficiaries pay to participate in the 
program. By the end of 2010, the uninsured population had dropped to 9 million people 
(from 64 million in 2002) representing only 8 percent of the population (Bitran 2014). A 
study that summarizes results from all published evaluations concluded that Seguro 
Popular improved access to health services and reduced the prevalence of catastrophic and 
impoverishing health expenditures, especially for the poor (Knaul et al. 2012). 
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Another example of increasing access is Colombia’s reform that has sought to 
expand health insurance coverage by creating two regimes, a contributory regime for the 
nonpoor and a subsidized regime for the poor.15 Affiliation in the contributory regime is 
mandatory for dependent and independent workers whose monthly income is greater than a 
legal threshold, while individuals with an income below that threshold have to enroll in the 
subsidized regime. Benefits in the subsidized regime are financed with 1 percentage point 
contribution by the affiliates of the contributory regime plus subsidies from the nation’s 
Treasury. This move toward a subsidized national health insurance system made it possible 
for Colombia to achieve universal health coverage by 2009 (Bitran 2014). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the reform improved access to healthcare and financial protection 
against health shocks for beneficiaries (Giedion et al. 2009). 
Peru complemented its social health insurance program, which covers formal 
workers, with a voluntary Integral Health Insurance Program (Seguro Integral de Salud - 
SIS) that covers poor and low-income individuals working in the informal sector. Families 
wishing to qualify are subject to a means test, known as the Household Targeting System. 
The SIS is financed by general revenues of the government. By the end of 2010, the 
proportion of uninsured Peruvians dropped from two-thirds to one-third. However, it is 
important to note that expanding nominal coverage may not necessarily lead to bridging 
gaps in access to health services. In Peru, these gaps persist and are large (Bitran 2014). 
Other developing countries have also applied this strategy. For instance, Vietnam 
has recognized that expanding coverage based on contributory mechanisms alone is not 
feasible in a context where a large share of the population is still poor, in the informal 
                                                          
15 In 1990, Colombia adopted a new Constitution that emphasized social program spending for the poor. Law 
100 of 1993 reformed the social security system, including pensions, workplace accidents, complementary 
social services, and health insurance. 
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sector, or both (Somanathan et al. 2012). Vietnam’s Health Insurance Law of 2008 
mandated enrollment of all citizens in the country’s social health insurance agency (SHI). 
With the aim of promoting enrollment, certain population groups, including the poor, are 
not required to make any contribution to SHI. In addition, the government subsidizes 70 
percent of a flat premium for the near-poor and 30 percent for medium-income farmers. 
Nearly 60 percent of the country’s population was covered by SHI by the end of 2010 
(Bitran 2014). 
Some health insurance programs are focused on specific population groups. For 
instance, the Maternal-Child Health Insurance Program in Argentina, known as Plan Nacer, 
has sought to reduce maternal and child mortality among uninsured pregnant women and 
children through highly innovative results-based financing mechanisms at the national, 
provincial, and provider levels. This program was one of the central pillars of a broader and 
integrated package of propoor policy reforms intended to increase the availability of 
healthcare services for the uninsured. It became a powerful tool in increasing coverage of 
basic services among the uninsured population.  
Another way to expand the coverage of health insurance involves public provision 
of subsidized health insurance. Under this approach, insurance is compulsory, so coverage 
extends to the entire population. All citizens have free or nearly free access to healthcare at 
least in terms of facing zero or nearly zero costs, regardless of whether they belong to the 
formal or informal sector. This system is used in some high-income countries, including the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, and it predominates in 
some developing countries. Probably the best-known example of public provision of 
healthcare services is the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, whose principal 
source of financing is general tax revenue. The National Health Service provides free care 
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or nearly free care to UK citizens regardless of whether they belong to the formal or 
informal sector. 
One of the first LAC countries to adopt this strategy was Brazil. Starting in 1988, 
Brazil abandoned its social health insurance system and created the tax-financed national 
health system (the Unified Health System - SUS), which provides comprehensive 
healthcare to all Brazilians irrespective of income, location, age, gender, or work status. 
The SUS unified the existing disparate contributory and public subsystems into one 
coordinated national system for which the entire population is eligible. A number of 
assessments of the SUS carried out over the years have generally pointed to significant 
achievements in improving access and contributing to bringing Brazil from lagging behind 
its peers in terms of health indicators to being a good performer (Couttolenc and 
Dmytraczenko 2013).  
In the developing world, Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme stands out as a 
widely publicized reform that sought to move away from the fragmented health system, 
which included a social health insurance component, to an integrated system financed 
through general tax revenues. Prior to the reform, one-third of the population lacked health 
insurance coverage, mostly informal sector workers. A review by the Health Insurance 
System Research Office (2012) reported that impoverishment among informal sector 
workers dropped as a result of the universal coverage reform. Health insurance coverage in 
Thailand is now universal (Bitran 2014). 
For a more radical reform, Levy (2008) proposes converting existing systems of 
social security for formal workers into universal social entitlements, in which health 
insurance would be included. He advocates eliminating wage-based social security 
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contributions and raising consumption taxes on higher-income households to improve 
benefits for workers, among other objectives. 
Thus, in thinking about ways to provide health insurance to poor, unskilled workers 
in the informal sector – who represent a large proportion of the workforce in a context 
where NCDs are commonplace – social health insurance systems combined with publicly 
subsidized health insurance programs, as well as tax-financed systems of public health, 
should both be considered valid options.  
 
7.1 The unintended consequences of health insurance 
Informality makes health insurance reform difficult, while at the same time health 
insurance reforms themselves may encourage informality because subsidized health 
insurance programs can increase the size of the informal sector. In other words, the 
coexistence of social health insurance programs with publicly subsidized health insurance 
plans that cover poor, unskilled workers in the informal sector can provide incentives for 
formal sector workers to switch to informal employment. By doing so, workers can avoid 
having to make otherwise mandatory contributions to the social health insurance system 
while receiving some free services under the new program. However, there is scarce robust 
empirical evidence, based on randomized control trials, of the actual effect of these 
programs on workers’ choices of formal or informal employment in the region. 
For instance, Camacho et al. (2009) examine whether publicly provided health 
insurance in Colombia discouraged formal employment. Using a difference-in-difference 
approach they found that informal employment was approximately 4 percentage points 
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higher than it would have been in the absence of the reform.16 The estimation includes year 
and municipality fixed effects as well as individual, household, and labor market controls.  
A similar phenomenon seems to have occurred in Mexico.  Aterido and Hallward-
Driemeier (2011) examine whether Mexico’s subsidized health insurance program for the 
poor, Seguro Popular, had the unintended consequence of promoting informal 
employment. Their identification strategy relies on the variation in the rollout of  Seguro 
Popular across municipalities and time, with the difference-in-difference estimation 
controlling for household fixed effects. These authors find that the program lowers 
formality by 0.4–0.7 percentage points.  
Thus, there appears to be a trade-off between the expansion of subsidized health 
insurance programs and workers’ choices of informal employment. Given the high rates of 
informality in LAC and the need to expand access to healthcare to the uninsured, long-term 
evaluation of the impact of publicly subsidized health insurance programs on the informal 
market is a research priority. Along these lines, it is also crucial to assess the effects of 
these programs on health status. The empirical evidence on the extent to which public 
health insurance programs improve health outcomes is very limited (Sloan and Hsieh 
2012).  
A better understanding of the distortions generated by these programs and the 
magnitude of their effects on both health status and informality is central to inform policy 
decisions.  Thus, a suggested area for research is on the way to use robust experimental 
evidence to establish with confidence the impact of subsidized health insurance programs 
on labor informality and health.  
                                                          
16 Camacho et al. (2009) define informality as employees between 12 and 65 years old who do not contribute 
to health insurance through employment. 
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7.2 Moral hazard and adverse selection in public health insurance programs 
The introduction of public health insurance programs may lead to moral hazard problems, 
which refers to the effect of insurance on the behavior of the insured. Ehrlich and Becker 
(1972) describe two different types of behavioral change, namely “ex-post moral hazard” 
and “ex-ante moral hazard.” Ex-ante moral hazard refers to the situation prior to the advent 
of illness; specifically, it describes the phenomenon in which the insured engage less in 
preventive behaviors because the cost of treating illness is lower with insurance coverage. 
Ex-post moral hazard, by way of contrast, comes into play once the health loss has already 
occurred. At this stage, individuals increase consumption of healthcare because health 
insurance has reduced the price of healthcare. 
Moral hazard is a concern because it conflicts with risk-spreading goals. Insurance 
is valuable because it allows people to transfer income from when they need it less to when 
they need it more. But this transfer is not perfect because people may increase their 
consumption of medical care when it is subsidized. This creates an inherent second-best 
problem in designing insurance policies: insurers must trade off the benefits from spreading 
more risk against the cost of increased moral hazard (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).  
One of the criteria that the literature has proposed for designing public health 
insurance programs is to minimize the efficiency loss resulting from the introduction of 
health insurance (Sloan and Hsieh 2012). The moral hazard problem leads to welfare loss 
because the social cost of increased consumption in healthcare exceeds the corresponding 
social benefit. The magnitude of welfare loss resulting from moral hazard depends on the 
price elasticity of demand for personal healthcare services. A higher elasticity, which 
means a higher responsiveness of healthcare demand to price changes, leads to a larger 
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welfare loss. This suggests that health services with respectively low price elasticities 
should be given higher priority as candidates for inclusion in public health programs than 
health services with higher price elasticities. For instance, the price elasticity of inpatient 
care is lower than the price elasticity of outpatient care (Newhouse 1993). Thus, almost all 
health insurance programs provide coverage for hospital care because of its lower price 
elasticity. In contrast, some insurance programs may exclude coverage of outpatient 
services because the utilization of such services is often more responsive to price changes 
(Sloan and Hsieh 2012). 
 Health insurance programs can also mitigate moral hazard by requiring providers to 
follow specified protocols for care, and by covering only a list of essential healthcare 
services. Still another way is to increase cost sharing, that is, the share of the payment to the 
provider that the insured consumer bears. While the increase in cost sharing increases 
expenditure, it reduces moral hazard. Thus, using tools to balance moral hazard and risk 
protection are important for the design of public health insurance programs. 
 One advantage of the direct public provision of health insurance, applied 
compulsorily to everyone, is that it avoids adverse selection by health insurance customers. 
Adverse selection arises when individuals select insurance policies based in part on their 
personal health when their health is not fully reflected in premium differences. In other 
words, with many insurance products available, healthy individuals may tend to buy lower-
cost policies offering less coverage, such as plans with higher deductibles, coinsurance, or 
co-pays, since they do not expect to become ill. By contrast, persons in poor health may 
demand more complete coverage. Under public provision of health insurance everyone is 
insured under the same terms, hence adverse selection is not an issue.  
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In theory, adverse selection can lead to the unraveling of insurance markets 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Not knowing each insured’s health risk, insurers frequently 
do not charge sufficiently different premiums to high-risk versus low-risk individuals. 
Thus, for any premium that allows the insurer to break even, insurance is an attractive 
purchase for the high-risk but not low-risk individuals. As a result, fewer low-risk persons 
demand insurance. To break even on the remaining persons it covers, the insurer must raise 
premiums. But at higher premiums, some people who bought insurance before decide 
against buying insurance. These are the lower-risk subgroup of the higher-risk group that 
purchased insurance. Again, with the resulting higher-risk pool of insureds, the insurer 
finds that its premium income is insufficient. So it raises premiums again, and the healthier 
persons in this group drop out of the insurance market. This process of unraveling could 
continue until only a very few high-risk individuals remain in the market. All the rest of the 
population is rendered worse off because they have lost a mechanism for reducing 
expenditure risk at premiums that are appropriate for the health expenditures they are likely 
to incur (Sloan and Hsieh 2012).  
 There are several approaches for dealing with adverse selection. As mentioned 
earlier, one way is to eliminate a choice of insurance plan and to provide a single public 
health insurance program. However, lack of choice may be welfare reducing in that less-
risk-adverse individuals would purchase less comprehensive policies than would more-risk-
averse individuals if choices were available (McGuire 2012).  
 
8 Conclusions 
The last 50 years in LAC have seen improvements in overall levels of health and life 
expectancy as well as reductions in infant mortality. Although the region is not completely 
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free of infectious diseases, it is well advanced in its demographic and epidemiological 
transitions, with health problems highly concentrated on NCDs. This rise of NCDs poses 
many new challenges for public policy and the effective delivery of health services. 
To address these challenges policymakers must define a health policy frontier that 
identifies primary interventions according to current health priorities. Thus, taking into 
account where LAC stands in terms of its demographic and epidemiological transitions, this 
paper proposes that the health policy frontier must include (1) public health policies that 
reduce the risk factors that cause NCDs by promoting healthy behavior, and (2) health 
insurance programs that offer households effective access to quality healthcare at costs that 
do not impoverish them.  
Finding ways to reduce the prevalence of the underlying risky behaviors that 
contribute to the growing trend of NCDs ‒ such as tobacco use, unhealthy diets, and 
physical inactivity ‒ has the potential to reduce at least part of this disease burden (WHO 
2013a). Nevertheless, traditional policy tools that are largely informed by a rational model 
of behavior have in many instances fallen short (Luoto and Carman 2014).  
Regarding health behavior, there is evidence that people face self-control problems 
and knowledge constraints, which may lead them to make suboptimal decisions. This paper 
has developed a simple theoretical model that predicts the impact of those biases on 
people’s behavior related to food consumption, which later leads to weight problems and 
obesity.  The comparative static of the model, which assesses the impact of caloric intake 
on health, shows that increases in the gap between best practices and what an individual 
actually believes lead to an overconsumption of food. Similarly, reductions in the discount 
parameter, which make consumers less forward-looking (i.e., they worry less about their 
future), lead to a more present-oriented consumption that is reflected in the 
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overconsumption of food. Thus, the model predicts that a consumer with self-control 
problems and knowledge gaps may well spend more than is optimal on food.  
This suggests that private decision-making in health can lead to inefficient outcomes 
and points to a potential role for cost-effective policies. Looking across the spectrum of 
health behaviors, behavioral economics offers insights that seem to hold promise for cost-
effective public interventions. Policies that combine the provision of information with 
counseling and with elements of behavioral economics, such as incentives or commitment 
mechanisms, appear as a promise to combat weight problems and obesity. However, the 
empirical literature suggests that providing incentives may only be effective in the short 
term. Therefore, an avenue for future research is identifying which interventions are the 
most cost-effective in achieving healthy behaviors in the long term.  
In the absence of these cost-effective interventions, policymakers could have to turn 
to second-best policies that involve “sin” taxes and subsidies to discourage the 
consumption of unhealthy food. Unfortunately, when the population is heterogeneous and a 
large group makes reliable decisions in their best interest, this type of intervention would be 
harmful to them. The overall evidence documents that price manipulations have the 
potential to encourage healthier eating, particularly when those manipulations are large. 
Nevertheless, improving the understanding of how changes in prices affect health outcomes 
and what pricing strategies would be optimal for addressing excess food consumption and 
rising rates of obesity is another research priority. 
 Apart from prevention, effective approaches to reduce the impact of NCDs should 
include broad access to healthcare for people with and at risk of NCDs. The provision of 
health insurance plays an important role because it increases health and financial security 
for many people. Since health insurance in LAC is mostly provided within the labor 
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market, effective access to healthcare services is restricted to workers in the formal sector, 
excluding an informal sector that encompasses approximately 50 percent of the region’s 
labor force. In this context, we are left with the question of the extent to which health 
coverage should be expanded.  There is little agreement among countries as to how best to 
achieve this.  Among the possibilities for policy interventions proposed in this paper is 
social health insurance systems combined with publicly subsidized health insurance 
programs, as well as tax-financed systems of public health. 
It is important to note that a potential unintended consequence of combining social 
health insurance with publicly subsidized health insurance programs is the perverse 
incentive it may create for formal sector workers to switch to informal employment. By 
doing so, workers could avoid having to make mandatory contributions to the social health 
insurance system while receiving some free services under the new program. The model 
presented in this paper shows that improvements in the provision of public healthcare will 
increase the size of the informal sector and decrease the wages of this sector. However, 
there is scarce empirical evidence of the effect of these interventions on workers’ choices of 
formal or informal employment in the region. Thus, a suggested area of research is on how 
to use robust experimental evidence to establish with confidence the impact of subsidized 
health insurance programs on informality and health. 
Finally, the introduction of public health insurance programs can lead to problems 
of moral hazard, which refers to the effect of insurance on the behavior of the insured. One 
of the criteria that the literature has proposed for designing public health insurance 
programs is to minimize the efficiency loss resulting from the introduction of health 
insurance. Policymakers have to balance moral hazard and risk protection in the design of 
public health insurance programs. 
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Appendix 1: A simple model of health, self-control, and household knowledge 
Proof of result 1: Equation (3.1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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The denomination is positive, and since           . Thus, the second term 
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Taking the total differential of equation (3.1) we get: 
     
 
      
    
 
  
  
       
      
 
    
     
                      
                          
    
 
  
                          
            
   
(A1.1) 
The first term of the right side of equation (A1.1) shows the change in the consumption of 
goods that affects health,   , in the presence of a change in the gap of knowledge,  . The 
sign of this term is positive if        , which is satisfied by the assumption in equation 
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(3.4) in the main text, and        . This means that an updating in the knowledge 
about X, and a more accurate understanding of the effect of a certain behavior regarding X 
on the individual’s health (represented by a reduction of  ), will lead to a reduction in the 
consumption of those goods that have a negative impact on health, such as caloric intake. 
Proof of result 2: Departing from equation (A1.1), the second term shows the 
response in the consumption of goods    to a change in the parameter  . The negative sign 
of this term indicates that increases in    which make consumers more forward-looking and 
thus less present-oriented in their consumption, lead to a reduction in the consumption 
of   . That means that individuals who care more about their future are more willing to 
adopt behaviors that help to prevent diseases in the future. 
Proof of result 3: Equation (3.2) in the main text can be rewritten as follows: 
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Taking the total differential of equation (3.2) we get: 
     
                   
 
  
                    
   
  
                   
 
  
                    
   
(A1.2) 
The first term of the right side of equation (A1.2) shows the change in the consumption of 
goods that affects health,   , in the presence of a change in the gap of knowledge,  . The 
sign of this term is positive if        , which is satisfied by the assumption in equation 
(3.5) in the main text, and        . This means that an updating in the knowledge 
about X, and a more accurate understanding of the effect of a certain behavior regarding X 
on the individual’s health (represented by a reduction of  ), will lead to a reduction in the 
consumption of those goods that have a negative impact of health, such as caloric intake. 
Proof of result 4: Departing from equation (A1.2), the second term shows the 
response in the consumption of goods    to a change in the parameter  . The sign of this 
term is negative if        , which is satisfied by the assumption in equation (3.5), and 
       . Therefore an increase in  , which makes consumers more forward-looking, 
and thus less present-oriented in their consumption, leads to a reduction in the consumption 
of    . That means that individuals who care more about their future are more willing to 
adopt behaviors that help to prevent diseases in the future, in contrast to individuals who 
are more impatient. 
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Appendix 2: Health insurance and informality: Model structure17 
There are three types of economic agents: firms, workers, and the government; however 
this framework only models the behavior of the first two agents.   
Firms produce a homogenous good that is traded in a perfectly competitive market 
using managerial talent (m) and homogenous units of labor (l). We assume that the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, thereby presenting 
diminishing returns to labor. There is a continuum of firms indexed by their innate 
managerial talent and distributed with density function g(m) with support in R+. Each firm 
in the economy chooses whether to operate formally or informally and decides how many 
units of labor it will hire to produce its output. If a firm operates in the formal sector of the 
economy, its profit function is given by:  
   1 1f fm m l w l t
       , 
where 1m l  is the Cobb-Douglas production function, wf is the prevailing wage per unit of 
labor paid to workers in the formal sector (i.e., firms are wage-takers), t is the payroll tax 
levied on firms, and  is a fixed cost incurred by firms that operate formally. If, on the other 
hand, a firm operates informally, then its expected profit function is given by: 
    1 1i im m l wl q     , 
where wi  is the prevalent wage per unit of labor paid to workers in the informal sector and 
q is the probability that a firm is caught operating informally, in which case it will be closed 
and will lose its current profits.  
                                                          
17 This appendix  is mainly a summary of the model developed by Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012). We 
use this model to discuss the effects of informality on the insurance coverage. 
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Firms choose l in order to maximize profits. Under the assumptions made, the 
derived labor demand for a firm with managerial talent m is 
 
 
1/
1
1
f
f
l m
w t

 
    
, 
if it operates formally, and 
 
1/
1i
i
l m
w

 
  
 
, 
if it operates informally. Note that both demand functions are linear in managerial talent. 
Thus, the size of a firm (assuming that it does not switch sectors), measured by l, is linearly 
increasing in m. 
Very small firms (i.e., those with managerial talent m close to 0) operate informally 
because of the fixed cost  that they would have to incur in order to operate formally. As in 
Rauch (1991), there is size dualism: small firms operate informally while large firms 
operate formally. When there are firms operating formally and the profit functions satisfy 
the following condition, there is a unique cut-off point in firm size:   
   f id m d m
dm dm
 
         m.                                           (A2.1) 
Condition (A2.1) is equivalent to: 
 
 
 
 1 / 1 /
1 1
1
1f i
q
w t w
    
   
        
 .                                    (A2.2) 
Hence, in equilibrium, it is necessary that inequality (A2.2) be satisfied in order to have 
firms operating formally. Therefore, we established that, in equilibrium, whenever there are 
both formal and informal firms, there is a unique cut-off point ( m ) that satisfies   
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   f im m  . 
Thus, firms with managerial talent m m  choose to operate informally while firms with 
managerial talent m m  choose to operate formally.  
The total demand for labor is then:  
 
 
 
1
0
1
,
m
d f i
i
L w w m g m dm
w
 
  
 
 +
 
 
 
1
1
1fm
m g m dm
w t
  
   
 , 
where the first term represents the demand for informal labor and the second the demand 
for formal labor. 
Workers are endowed with l units of homogenous labor. There is a continuum of 
workers indexed by their endowment of labor and distributed with density function h(l) 
with support in R+. Thus, wages are set for units of substitutable labor. Each worker has to 
choose whether to sell his/her labor to a firm that operates formally or to a firm that 
operates informally. Workers cannot split their units of labor between different firms. In the 
first case, the worker receives wf  per unit of labor plus mandated social benefits. In the 
second case, the worker receives only wi per unit of labor and we assume the worker 
receives healthcare only in public hospitals     . 
The utility of a worker who chooses to work in the formal sector is:  
 ,f f fU w l HI w l HI    , 
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where HI are the nonpecuniary benefits that, for simplicity’s sake, we equate with a 
government-provided health insurance package that we assume covers all members of the 
worker’s family.18,19  
Workers also incur a fixed cost  for working in the formal sector. This includes the 
direct costs (De Soto 1989) but also, and perhaps more importantly, indirect costs such as 
unemployment insurance and other subsidies, such as cash transfers, that a worker would 
have to disregard when he or she accepts a formal job. 
When an informal firm is detected, its workers do not receive their payment. The 
expected utility of a worker who chooses to work in the informal sector is:  
                      , 
where    represents the health services that informal workers received in the public health 
sector. 
When there are workers in both the formal and the informal sector and the utility 
functions satisfy the following condition, then there is a unique cut-off point that 
determines that workers with low levels of human capital will be in the informal sector and 
those with high levels of human capital will be employed in the formal sector: 
   f idU l dU l
dl dl
      l .                                                (A2.3) 
Condition (A2.3) holds if and only if: 
 1f
i
w
q
w
  .                                                           (A2.4) 20 
                                                          
18 Although for the sake of simplicity we equate mandated social benefits with a health insurance package that 
provides better health coverage than public hospitals, there are other mandated benefits associated with formal 
jobs that affect workers’ payoffs similarly. Examples are pensions and family allowances. 
19 There is a large literature in the United States that shows that health insurance is an important determinant 
of job mobility (Gruber and Madrian 2004). Madrian (1994), for example, estimates that health insurance 
reduces mobility across jobs by as much as 25 percent. See also Gruber (2000). 
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The cut-off point is the level of l that makes workers indifferent as to whether they 
work in the formal or informal sector. We denote this level of l by l , which is determined 
by 
                        
or  
                     , 
and solving for l  we obtain: 
   
       
          
   
Note that workers with ll  prefer to work in the formal sector,21 so workers with 
l l operate informally while workers with l l operate formally. Thus, this is the first 
important result in terms of health. Poor, unskilled, workers would not receive health 
insurance because they are working in the informal sector.22  
The total supply of labor is: 
   
0
,
l
s f iL w w lh l dl  +   s
l
lh l dl L

 , 
where the first term represents the supply of informal labor and the second the supply of 
formal labor.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 Note that the formal sector wage premium is not signed. This result holds when workers of informal firms 
do not receive their payments (as assumed in the model). But it is robust to having the punishment with a 
lower probability, as long as the probability is not zero.   
21 Note that if condition (A2.4 holds and HI  , all workers would prefer to work in the formal sector. 
Additionally, as is plausible, if the worker’s utility is such that it assigns positive utility to mandate social 
benefits only after a minimum level of income is achieved (wl), then condition (A2.4) guarantees a cut-off 
point regardless of the sign of HI-. 
22 This result is present in Latin American data. See, for example, Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012). 
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The equilibrium analysis is restricted to the cases where there are firms and workers 
operating in both the formal and informal sectors. An equilibrium is then a (wf ; wi ; ls
f ; ls
i; 
ld
f; ld
i) vector such that there is market clearing in both the formal and informal labor 
markets, and where wages satisfy inequalities (A2.3) and (A2.4).  
An equilibrium for this economy can be represented, graphically, as shown in 
Figure A2.1. The downward sloping curve represents the locus of wages where total labor 
demand is equal to total labor supply.23 Any equilibrium in this economy must lie 
somewhere on this curve.24 While total labor demand and supply are equal along this curve, 
their composition is not. Each point maps to a different (ls
f; ls
i; ld
f; ld
i) vector. In the same 
figure we can also draw the functions wf (wi) showing the wage pairs that would align labor 
demand and supply within each sector of the economy.25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 The assumption that the derivative of total labor demand with respect to wages is negative guarantees that 
the curve is downward sloping. 
24 This always holds if the direct effects predominate over the indirect effects. If there is a case where the 
indirect effect is positive and predominates over the direct effect, wf
H(wi) is not necessarily a function (i.e., for 
a given informal wage there could be different formal wages that satisfy wf
H(wi)). If this were the case, there 
could be multiple equilibriums in the economy that might generate interesting economic effects. However, a 
discussion of such effects extends beyond the scope of the analysis. 
25 It can be shown that both curves are upward sloping and that the slope of the equilibrium in the informal 
sector is greater than the one of the formal. 
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Figure A2.1 Equilibrium wages 
 
                                             Source: Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) 
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